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The phenomenon of populism has been a passionately debated topic of political science. Many 
among political thinkers, theorists and actual decision-makers have not only shared a common 
point of interest and concern, but they also have approached from a variety of different aspects. 
As can be witnessed in current times, the threat of the populist “awakening” has not exclusively 
been the experience of relatively recently democratized countries, but also of enduring and 
stable democracies. The present thesis is to serve as the introduction and comparison of two 
examples with consociational arrangement, from the latter category – namely, of Belgium and 
the Netherlands.  
The core of my inquiry lies in the fundamental discrepancy between the traditional 
eagerness of conventional parties to cooperate and the populist parties with the intention to 
oppose the arrangement of the former. According to my supposition, the political activity of the 
Vlaams Belang in Belgium and the Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands generates a tense 
relation to the consociational arrangement. Namely, these populist factions articulate an 
exclusive idea of the society – “the people” – which seems to oppose the inclusive nature of 
consociationalism. Also, their anti-establishment nature contrasts the cooperation and 
consensus of the elite, whom tend to react to this rather “antisocial” political behaviour with a 
sort of dissociation, the application of the so-called cordon sanitaire. The conclusion that I will 
endeavour to draw from the case studies of Belgium and the Netherlands in the last, concluding 
chapter, will hopefully be able to support the following hypothesis: the Flemish Vlaams Belang 
and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid have been kept in a distance from actual power, however, 
their presence have resulted in the traditional parties borrowing elements from their agenda. 
It is an unconcealed hope of the author that the thesis will eventually be able to 
demonstrate that as democracy itself can be viewed as a diverse system, populism by which it 
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“…civil  society  in  a  democracy  is  both  complex  and  pluralistic,   
and  both  its  complexities  and  pluralism   
must  be  properly  accommodated  in  and  by  the  polity.”1   
(Daniel  J.  Elazar)   
 
It  may  sound  as  a  cliché  –  thus  it  is  certainly  true  –  that  one  could  hardly  point  to  a  
country  as  one  lacking  any  social  pluralism  –  as  is  equally  true  the  turn-around  of  the  
worn-out  commonplace:  it  is  close  to  being  certain  that  there  is  some  type  and  amount  
of  pluralism  in  almost  every  state.  In  some  cases,  however,  the  internal  borders  of  the  
society  have  ossified  into  divisions.  The  appearance  of  the  supranational  besides  –  or  
above  –  the  national  level  of  politics,  and  the  enlargement  of  the  competences  of  the  
subnational  at  the  expense  of  the  national  level  in  some  cases,  the  general  growth  of  
mobility,  the  populous  migrant  communities  in  some  Western  European  countries,  and  
the  braying  of  the  right-wing  radicals  –  all  the  above  suggest  the  modification  of  the  
traditional  roles  –  and  limits  –  of  the  state.  And  that  is  why  the  analysis  of  the  
European  political  cultures  becomes  reasonable  and  valid.  (Table  1  shows  the  support  
for  populist  parties  in  the  European  Parliamentary  elections  in  a  ten-year  period,  between  
2004  and  2014  –  which  seems  rather  appropriate,  since  in  May  2019,  European  citizens  
will  vote  the  EP  representatives,  again.) 
The  present  thesis  touches  upon  a  tiny,  still  significant  piece  of  the  above  –  
rather  widely  –  described  topic,  insofar  as  it  attempts  to  make  sense  of  the  political  
stability  and  the  peaceful  coexistence  through  the  consociational  approach,  as  the  systems’  
socio-political  “decoration”.  In  order  to  challenge  the  contemporary  role  and  strength  of  
the  consociational  theory,  we  will  investigate  along  the  following  question:  to  what  
extent  have  the  populist  parties  of  the  Low  Countries  affected  the  traditionally  cooperative  
political  decision-making,  and  as  such,  the  peaceful  coexistence  in  recent  years?  We  
suggest  that  there  is  some  degree  of  interconnectedness  between  the  political  
establishment  and  its  challengers,  according  to  which  they  mutually  affect  the  policies  
and  rhetoric  of  each  other.  Having  the  above  in  mind,  we  would  like  to  point  to  the  
nature  of  the  challenges  and  threats  that  the  consociational  arrangement  has  had  to  face  
in  contemporary  times.  In  addressing  these  questions,  the  experiences  and  lessons  of  
two  multicultural  European  states  will  be  of  help.  Although  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  
–  the  countries  that  we  reached  out  to  for  help  –  both  are  parts  of  the  Low  Countries  
                                                             
1 Elazar, 1985, 33-34 




and  as  such  must  have  some  common  historical  experience,  their  comparison  can  be  
explained  elsehow,  and  thus,  is  less  random  than  that.  That  is  to  say  –  as  it  is  widely  
known  –,  both  cases  can  serve  as  rich  and  instructive  examples  of  social-political  
division:  in  Belgium,  the  Flemish-Walloon  rivalry  has  been  a  lasting  source  of  conflict2,  
whereas  the  Netherlands,  as  a  now  depillarised  society,  has  witnessed  the  articulation  of  
two  immigrant  parties,  which  development  might  evoke  some  memories  of  the  era  of  
the  “accommodation”3,  and  thus  may  find  its  way  back  to  the  consociational  instruments,  
again.  While  Belgium  has  the  tradition  of  social  tension  in  her  own  political  history,  
which  might  well  be  relevant,  still  today,  for  the  Netherlands,  social  tension  might  mean  
the  renewed  version  of  old  social  dynamics.  In  Belgium,  as  in  the  Netherlands,  the  
party  system  has  been  able  to  model  the  developments  of  social  division.  On  the  
following  pages,  we  would  like  to  shed  light  on  the  relation  between  the  old  parties  of  
the  political  establishment  and  its  relatively  new  anti-establishment  opposition.  
Accordingly,  we  will  investigate  how  the  parties  of  the  former  has  balanced  between  
the  increasing  popularity  of  Belgian  (Flemish,  to  be  more  precise)  and  Dutch  right-wing  
and/or  populist  parties.  We  suggest  that  the  consociational  democracies  –  at  least,  in  
our  two  chosen  cases,  certainly  –  provide  authentic  instances  of  the  rise  of  a  new  elite,  
regarding  the  fact  that  cooperation  and  coalition  formation  are  in  the  core  of  the  
consociational  arrangement.  Putting  the  countries  under  question  on  the  cover  of  
consociationalism  is  worthwhile,  should  it  seem  desirable  to  nuance  and  modify,  if  
necessary,  the  general  beliefs  about  these  two  countries  –  all  so,  taking  the  political  
culture,  the  mentality  embedded  into  it,  and  the  overall  spirit,  into  consideration.  Bringing  
a  perspective  of  longer  run  to  the  front,  it  is  recommendable  and,  hopefully,  useful  to  
think  and  write  about  the  features  and  possibilities  of  consociational  states  as  a  result  
of  the  fact  that  such  an  observation  could  function  as  a  cure  to  societies  divided  by  
the  cleavages  of  the  segments  of  society.4  As  Wouter  de  Been  confirms  our  belief,  
“consociationalism  in  its  generic  form  of  power  sharing  is  still  topical  and  relevant.  The  
revolution  in  information  and  communication  technology  has  changed  the  habitat  in  
                                                             
2 Capturing the nature of the lasting “frozen” tension between Flanders and Wallonia, Mnookin and Verbeke wrote 
an article under the following title, in 2009: Persistent Nonviolent Conflict With No Reconciliation: The Flemish 
and Walloons in Belgium. In: Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72 No. 2, pp. 151-186, 2009. 
3 We are here referring to the title of Arend Lijphart’s already-appeared work. 
4 The consociational instruments are enumerated in a descriptive manner in the theoretical framework only; 
employing and implementing these will give the spine of the case studies, hence the focus of the Belgian and Dutch 




which  minorities  exist.”5  Thus,  the  chapters  below  undertake  the  contemporary  
employment  of  Arend  Lijphart’s  findings  on  “political  accommodation.”   
The  structure  of  the  investigation  below  should  reflect  these  intentions.  Following  
the  clarification  of  the  thesis’  theoretical  framework  –  thus  defining  the  phenomenon  of  
divided  societies  and  consociationalism  –,  the  spine  of  the  analysis  will  be  lying  on  
two  case  studies.  Next,  having  laid  down  the  relevance  of  an  analysis  on  
consociationalism  in  each  of  these  countries,  certain  processes  integral  of  the  societal  
coexistence  –  in  Belgium’s  case  it  is  the  process  of  federalisation,  while  in  the  
Netherlands’  it  is  the  pillarisation  and  de-pillarisation  –  will  be  introduced.  Introducing  
the  two  processes  serves  us  thus  we  can  point  to  a  fundamental  difference  –  exposed  
by  de  Been  –  between  the  two  cases,  with  regard  to  the  position  of  the  segments.  
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  on  the  one  hand,  will  exemplify  the  traditional  system  of  
consociationalism.6  What  is  meant  by  this  is  to  explore  consociationalism  as  “a  modus  
vivendi  for  established  indigenous  communities,”  which  offered  a  set  of  pragmatic  cure  
“for  the  political  stalemate  of  religious  and  ideological  segmentation.”7  In  such  a  
settlement,  each  segment  is  of  indispensable  importance  –  were  any  of  them  to  secede  
(such  as  the  Vlaams  Belang  has  cherished  the  fantasy  of  Flemish  secession  and  
independence  from  Belgium),  the  national  unity,  as  it  is,  would  dissolve.  On  the  other  
hand,  our  suggestion  here  is  that  there  might  be  evolving  the  re-awakening  of  the  “old”  
arrangement  in  contemporary  Holland  in  a  new  type  of  multicultural  setting  with  new  
social  divisions.  Additionally,  since  the  importance  and  the  determining  role  of  political  
elites  in  consociational  theory  is  hereby  accepted,  as  a  reflection  to  this,  both  case  
studies  include  some  chapters  relating  the  Belgian  and  the  Dutch  party  system.8  According  
to  our  supposition,  the  political  activity  of  the  Vlaams  Belang  in  Belgium  and  the  Partij  
Voor  de  Vrijheid  in  the  Netherlands  generates  a  tense  relation  to  the  consociational  
arrangement  due,  mainly,  to  two  reasons.  First,  these  –  and  certainly,  other  –  populist  
factions  articulate  an  exclusive  idea  of  the  society  –  “the  people”  –  which  seems  to  
oppose  the  inclusive  nature  of  consociationalism.  Second,  their  anti-establishment  nature  
contrasts  the  cooperation  and  consensus  of  the  elite,  whom  tend  to  react  to  this  rather  
                                                             
5 de Been, 2012, 531 
6 In the former case, we presume that this assumption is still valid; whereas, as we are about to see, in the latter 
case, the depillarisation brought this sort of order to an end. 
7 de Been, 2012, 535 
8 Although hereby, with regard to reasons of space, we are not discussing them sufficiently: instead of an 






“anti-social”  political  behaviour  with  a  sort  of  dissociation,  the  application  of  the  so-
called  cordon  sanitaire.  Finally,  the  conclusion  that  we  draw  from  the  case  studies  of  
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  in  the  last,  concluding  chapter,  will  hopefully  be  able  to  
support  the  following  hypothesis:  the  Flemish  Vlaams  Belang  and  the  Dutch  Partij  voor  
de  Vrijheid  have  been  kept  in  a  distance  from  actual  power,  however,  their  presence  
have  resulted  in  the  traditional  parties  borrowing  elements  from  their  agenda. 
Although  it  can  be  taken  as  given  that  both  of  the  countries  above,  at  one  point  
or  other  of  their  existence,  were  in  possession  of  certain  features  of  the  consociational  
order,  and  turned  to  its  instruments,  they  never  became  unanimous  and  identical  due  to  
their  consociational  character.  Such  an  inquiry  seems  viable,  assuming  that  there  are  
imminent  challenges  posed  both  to  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands.  Hence,  all  in  all,  it  
might  be  possible  that  these  countries  will  be  forced  to  redefine  or  clarify  their  roles,  
at  one  point,  in  a  milieu  where  the  political  left-right  dimension  has  lost  of  its  relevance.  
However,  before  addressing  these  issues,  it  is  important  to  note  that  although  the  thesis  
below  leans  heavily  on  the  theoretical  guidelines  of  consociationalism,  it  does  not  
however  in  itself  challenge  the  normative  elements  of  the  theory,  as  it  also  avoids  the  
systematic  enumeration  of  the  justifications  of  why  it  has  been  criticized  over  time.  Nor  
is  it  aimed  at  adding  more  elements  to  the  line  of  already-existing  criticism. It  should  
also  be  noted  already  at  the  outset,  that  we  had  to  define  the  concerned  time  span  
when  structuring  the  two  case  studies. As  the  script  was  finalized  on  the  15th  April  in  
2019, hereby,  we  will  present  April  2019  as  the  final  point  of  our  inquiry  –  in  such  a  
way,  we  will  refrain  from  the  assessment  of  the  three-level  –  regional,  federal  and  
European-level  –  elections  in  Belgium,  and  the  European-level  elections  in  the  
Netherlands,  all  being  held  in  May  2019.     
 
 2004 2009 2014 
Change  in  




2.6 17 13.3 10.7 
Belgium 17.1 11.2 6.4 -10.7 
Table  1.  Support  for  radical  right  parties  at  EP  elections  (2004-2014)9 
 
                                                             




1. Consociational  democracy;  the  phenomenon  of  consociationalism 
The  fragmented  society  and  the  functioning  democracy  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  
did  the  ‘coin’  here  refer  to  the  reality  of  Belgium’s  and  the  Netherlands’  contemporary  
politics.  The  mere  fact  that  they  are  simultaneous  phenomena  in  itself  makes  their  
relationship  tense  and  worth  to  be  investigated.  This,  with  good  chance,  could  have  
been  what  led  Arend  Lijphart  to  analyse  the  political  practices  and  structures  in  his  
country  of  origin,  the  Netherlands.  In  his  Politics  of  Accommodation10,  he  found  that  
those  given  division(s)  originating  in  the  fragmentation  of  the  society  due  to  class  and  
religion  express  themselves  through  a  political  channel  were  materialised  in  the  Dutch  
party  system.  The  issue  of  the  volume  was  followed  and  awarded  by  significant  success  
as  a  result  of  its  achievement  in  capturing  the  nature  of  the  “paradoxical  case  of  strong  
social  segmentation  or  pillarisation  which  was  also  marked  by  stability  and  democracy.  
That  is,  contrary  to  expectations,  Holland  is  both  stable  and  democratic  despite  its  
extensive  social  cleavages,”  concludes  van  Schendelen.11  Although  the  expression  itself  
was  absent  in  his  original  1968  book,  Lijphart’s  inquiry  grew  over  the  borders  of  a  
case  study;  rather,  it  turned  out  to  be  the  establishment  of  the  theory  of  consociational  
democracy.12   
 In  his  Thinking  About  Democracy13,  Lijphart  refers  to  Almond’s  classification  of  
political  systems,  which  “derives  its  theoretical  significance  from  the  relationship  it  
establishes  between  political  culture  and  social  structure  on  the  one  hand  and  political  
stability  on  the  other  hand.”14  Reaching  back  to  Almond’s  original  1956  article15,  first,  
he  introduces  two  criteria  –  the  role  structure  and  political  culture  –,  based  on  which  
he  finds  that  it  is  possible  to  observe  Western  democratic  political  systems  in  a  two-
fold  classification,  instead  of  Almond’s  four-fold  typology.  Accordingly,  the  two  rather  
broad  categories  would  be  the  following,  did  we  restrict  our  focus  to  the  European  
scene:  1.  the  United  Kingdom  (the  Anglo-Saxon  sphere  without  the  United  Stated  and  
the  Commonwealth)  along  with  Scandinavian  countries,  and  2.  the  remaining  European  
democracies,  with  the  Low  Countries  –  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  –,  among  others.  
                                                             
10 Arend Lijphart (1968): The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. 
University of California Press, California, 1968. The book was originally written in English; only later was it 
translated to Dutch.  
11 van Schendelen, 1983, 144 
12 Bogaards, 2000, 395 
However, Lijphart admits that he “borrowed” the expression from David Apter. (Lijpharts, 2008, 3) 
13 Arend Lijphart (2008): Thinking About Democracy: Power-sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. 
Routledge – Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, 2008 
14 Lijphart, 2008, 25 
15 Gabriel A. Almond (1956): Comparative Political Systems. In: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18. No. 3, pp. 




While  the  former  has  its  roots  in  a  homogeneous  political  culture,  the  latter  typically  
has  a  more  fragmented  party  landscape.  These  historically  embedded  patterns  have  
resulted  in  the  establishment  of  a  two-party  system  in  the  former,  whereas  a  multi-party  
system  in  the  latter.16  As  for  the  dimension  of  the  electoral  system,  the  consociational  
concept  itself  –  as  is  generally  accepted  in  the  relevant  literature17  –  is  a  non-majoritarian  
or  proportional  form  of  democracy,  whereas  the  Westminster  system  functions  on  
majoritarian  principles.18  Consociationalism’s  non-majoritarian  nature  has  been  equally  
approved,  however,  it  might  be  misleading,  at  the  same  time.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  
true  that  none  of  the  subnational  units  in  themselves  have  the  majority  needed  to  form  
a  government  alone  –  that  is  exactly  why  elites  have  to  reach  out  for  alliances  during  
the  government  formation  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  thus-born  
coalitions  themselves  are  aimed  at  constructing  a  majority.  But  here,  we  bump  into  the  
crucial  distinction  between  the  two  main  types  of  democratic  systems.  That  is  to  
acknowledge,  that  in  the  core  of  Lijphart’s  theory  lies  the  principle  of  inclusiveness:  
the  broader  percentage  of  society  political  arrangements  involve  and  include,  the  better  
–  whereas  in  majoritarian  democracies,  potentially  significant  portions  of  the  society  are  
kept  away  as  their  choice,  at  the  end  of  the  day,  will  not  be  reflected  in  the  government’s  
composition.19  This  notion  was  perfectly  captured  by  Elazar  who  made  a  distinction  
between  simple  majoritarianism  and  compound  majoritarianism.20  Based  on  the  short  –  
and  supposedly  imperfect  –  review  of  the  features  of  consociationalism,  it  does  not  
come  as  a  surprise  that  consociational  democracies  are  classified  to  belong  to  the  latter  
category.  According  to  this  concept,  majorities  are  aggregated  “either  from  distinct  
territories  (territorial  democracy)  or  concurrent  groups  (consociationalism)  rather  than  
being  counted  through  simple  addition.”21  Hence,  the  elections  will  reflect  and  consider  
the  underlying  divisions  without,  however,  renouncing  the  principle  of  majority.  Second,  
he  adds  the  behaviour  of  the  elites  to  the  two  above-mentioned  elements,  and  refers  to  
this  third  one  as  something  which  is  of  fundamental  significance,  and  which  as  such  
“can  account  for  the  stability  of  the  consociational  democracies.”22 
                                                             
16 Almond, 1956, 397 
17 See e.g.: Andeweg, 2000; Elazar, 1985; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2014. 
18 Elazar, 1985, 19 
19 Lijphart, 2008, 89-93; Ganghof, 2010, 680 
20 Elazar, 1985, 19 
21 Ibid 




As  Lijphart  himself  admitted23,  after  1969,  he  preferred  the  usage  of  another  
terms:  insisting  on  the  vailidity  of  his  findings,  Lijphart  broadened  the  concept,  turning  
to  different  terminology.  In  the  1980s,  consensual  democracy  began  to  seem  more  
appropriate,  while  nowadays,  since  the  1990s,  power-sharing  has  been  the  most  frequently  
used  expression  –  for  a  broader  phenomenon.24  Additionally,  paralelly  to  the  expansion  
of  terminology,  his  geographical  scope  of  analysis  fundamentally  broadened  from  the  
1970s  on;  contrary  to  the  fact  that  Lijphart’s  work  was  published  at  the  end  of  the  
1960s,  which  investigated  the  conditions  of  the  Netherlands  exclusively,  the  principles  
and  hypotheses  were  applied  and  challenged  in  comparisons  of  a  variety  of  countries.25   
Van  Schendelen’s  reminds  us,  one  could  ignore  the  importance  of  the  concept:  
his  fellow  Dutchman  stood  up  with  his  theory  in  the  1960s,  thus  in  a  period,  he  argues,  
when  the  survival  of  European  democracies  –  contemplated  with  concern,  we  suggest  –  
could  have  seemed  questionable.26  What  is  more,  following  Bogaards’  reasoning,  the  
cooperative  attitude  of  the  elites  –  according  to  Lijphart’s  account  –  is  pictured  as  the  
hithertho  unidentified  link  between  the  pluralist  society  and  democracy  along  with  its  
promise  of  peaceful  societal  relations.27  To  Lijphart,  consociational  democracy  is  a  form  
of  governance  which  is  based  on  –  and  is  dependent  of  –  the  cooperation  of  the  
political  elites  of  a  given  society.  In  such  a  system,  agreements  are  made  and  consensus  
is  reached  by  political  actors  in  order  to  develop  their  fragmented  society  into  a  stable  
democracy.  It  explains  his  considerable  attention  to  the  political  elites  during  his  research.  
To  describe  them,  Lijphart  drafted  four  criteria:  these  concerned  the  ability,  on  one  
hand,  to  harmonise  and  balance  the  segments’  interests,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  rise  
above  the  differences  to  make  joint  efforts.  To  these,  two  more  factors  were  added:  
beside  owning  the  determination  for  stability  and  cohesion,  it  is  also  crucial  that  the  
leading  politicians  are  aware  of  the  dangers  of  fragmentation.28  The  certain  groups  have  
partial  autonomy29,  and  in  their  possession  of  self-rule,  the  pluralist  nature  of  the  state  
becomes  institutionalised.  Proportionality  is  also  a  precondition  to  the  consociational  
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27 Bogaards, 2014, 2   
28 Lijphart, 1975, 188   
29 That is to say, in terms of the Belgian segments, the literature discusses linguistic and ethnic segmental 
autonomy; as subsequent chapters will confirm. In the Netherlands, however, the pragmatic and task-centred 




settlement,  whilst  the  mutual  veto  provided  for  minorities  facilitates  to  indicate,  were  a  
certain  group’s  interest  about  to  be  harmed.30   
In  addition  to  the  four  above-mentioned  features,  in  his  1977  book31,  Lijphart  –  
nuancing  his  theory  and  benefitting  from  its  flexible  contours  –  enumerated  the  
characteristics  and  gave  some  more  of  them  to  the  list.  These  favour  the  creation  and  
the  sustanence  of  consociational  democracies  –  although  they  are,  in  fact,  neither  
necessary,  nor  sufficient  factors.32  To  the  principle  of  balance  of  power  –  which  if  
conditions  are  favourable  do  not  materialise  between  two  segments,  or  centralise  in  the  
hands  of  one  segment  only  –  two  further  parallel  criteria  are  attached:  beside  the  
equilibrium,  at  least  three  separate  segments  are  indispensable  since  these  ensure  that  
each  “slice”  of  the  society  is  in  a  minority  position.33  Elaborating  the  factor  of  the  
multi-party  system,  Lijphart  turns  to  Giovanni  Sartori’s  “calculations,”  which  show  that  
there  is  not  one  numerical  confine  which  is  equally  efficient  in  every  country;  although,  
according  to  both  theorists,  for  pluralist  societies,  a  moderate  multi-party  system  with  
three  or  four  parties  are  likely  to  be  the  most  favourable  solution.34  Yet,  the  most  
relevant  principle  might  well  be  for  the  number  of  parties  to  comply  with  the  number  
of  segments  of  the  divided  society.  In  terms  of  the  size  of  the  country  under  examination,  
the  category  of  the  small  state  is  in  focus:  due  to  the  small  size,  the  internal  and  
external  effects  contribute  –  either  directly  or  indirectly  –  to  the  success  of  the  
consociational  order.  In  terms  of  the  direct  effect  of  being  small  (that  of  “smallness”),  
the  elites  themselves  stand  closer  to  each  other,  thus  –  knowing  one  another  –  their  
cooperation  is  supposed  to  be  more  or  less  effortless.  The  perception  of  an  external  
threat  is  added  here,  as  a  direct  external  effect.  To  sum  up  the  indirect  experience  of  
a  small  state:  there  are  supposedly  fewer  interests  to  harmonize,  whereas  the  direct  
impact  relating  the  cross-border  scene  has  its  roots  in  rejecting  the  role  to  take  part,  in  
an  active  and  assertive  way,  in  forming  foreign  policy.35                         
  One  could  apporach  the  characterisation  of  the  cleavages  –  in  line  with  Lijphart’s  
way  of  thought  –  based  on  the  following  classifications:  the  number  of  cleavages;  the  
extent  of  the  fragmentation  caused  by  them;  the  type  of  cleavages  and  the  degree  of  
overlapping;  effect  of  “overarching  loyalties,”  in  terms  of  equalisation;  finally,  the  
                                                             
30 Ibid 213-215   
31Arend Lijphart (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. Vail-Ballou Press, 
Binghamton, New York, 1977   
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interaction  of  the  party  system  and  social  cleavages.  In  order  to  define  the  size  of  
certain  groups  and  the  balance  of  power  which  materializes  on  the  latter’s  basis,  it  is  
worth  to  differentiate  between  “crosscutting”  and  “overlapping  cleavages”.36  Contrary  to  
the  latter  point,  the  so-called  “overarching  loyalties”  have  an  opposite  impact:  that  is  to  
say,  while  the  cleavages  themselves  are  to  create  and  catalyze  division,  adherence  to  
the  segments  lessens  the  potential  for  division.37  In  accordance  with  the  criterion  of  
representative  party  system,  the  parties  have  to  represent  the  individual  components  of  
the  population  –  in  other  words,  it  is  the  party  system  itself  to  cover  the  entire  
segmented  society.38  It  thus  seems  logical  to  establish  that  political  variability  and  
instability  increases  in  a  directly  proportional  way  with  the  fragmentation  of  the  political  
system.39  The  last  factor  to  mention  here,  may  with  good  chance  be  the  most  particular  
among  the  above-mentioned:  the  traditions  of  the  elites’  accommodation  encourages  us  
to  review  the  past  of  the  given  political  culture.  This  might  be  explained  by  the  
supposition,  according  to  which  the  application  and  validity  of  certain  practices  –  which  
were  introduced  as  the  results  of  an  organic  evolution  –  are  legitimized  by  the  time  
since  its  articulation.40     
Lijphart’s  theory  has  faced  criticism  and  challengers  since  the  1980s,  whom  claimed  
to  have  discovered  inaccuracy  and  deficiencies  in  connection  with  the  conceptualization  
of  the  research,  as  with  the  varibles.41  Even  Bogaards  hesitates  if  the  order  under  
question  were  to  be  recommended  –  if  Lijphart’s  reasoning  has  been  supported  by  the  
actual  experience  –,  Lijphart’s  contribution  to  political  science  stands  without  any  
question.42  In  Lijphart’s  defence,  the  following  could  be  claimed:  if  it  is  true  that  
“consociationalism  relates  to  the  character  of  a  regime,”43  the  Dutch  theorist  certainly  
made  important  steps  in  describing  it.  Following  the  structure  of  the  theoretical  
                                                             
36 Lijphart, 1977, 71-75  
Thus, in the former case, cleavages weaken the impression of being separate, in the latter, they strengthen it. 
37 In the relevant English literature, the dichotomy of “division-cohesion” is used. (Lijphart, 1977, 81) 
38 With regard to the focus of subsequent chapters on the Belgian and Dutch party system, the principle of 
representativeness remains here with no further detail.  
39 Founded on this, the judgment of segmental separation offers two distinct approaches. According to the first, 
paralelly to the decrease of clearcut borderlines, decreases interaction – and the chance for conflict. On the 
contrary, the second approaches from a different angle: to this, interaction and inter-segmental communication 
means the tool for mutual understanding. (Lijphart, 1977, 87-89) 
40 The expression in quotation marks remain here in Lijphart’s own words. (Lijphart, 1977, 71-103)   
41 To give some examples, the interpretation of political stability could indeed be more nuanced, since this factor 
has been viewed by Lijphart as the lack of revolts and revolutionary situations; nonetheless, according to van 
Schendelen, elites might fail if they cannot meet the demands of the society. (van Schendelen, 1983, 157) Another 
weakness of Lijphart’s account was found by Daalder, who cautioned theorists to pay more attention to the features 
of the specifically Dutch political culture and to how the country’s history has been reflected by its political system 
– just like early self-organization, the establishment of a pioneer European bureaucracy. (Daalder, 1989, 4; 12)   
42 Bogaards, 2010, 417  




framework-above,  consociationalism  refers  to  the  totality  of  the  instruments  enabling  the  
democratic  coexistence  of  societal  segments  –  and  not  as  an  ideal  normative  order  which  
is  sought  after.44         
  
                                                             
44 In de Been’s account: “Consociationalism is not usually put forward as an ideal to strive for.” (de Been, 2012, 
535) Ours is a more pragmatic approach, similarly to de Been’s: rather, it reflects the acknowledgement of a 





1.1. Societal  pluralism  and  division:  The  source  of  consociational  
democracy 
Societal  pluralism  –  which  is  a  fundamental  precondition  of  the  subcategories  of  pluralism  
–  is  concerned  with  the  acknowledgement  of  the  segmentation,  and  as  such,  we  suppose  
it  to  be  found  at  any  time  in  history.  The  more  narrow  definition  of  political  pluralism  
–  as  Szabó,  the  Hungarian  theorist  reminds  us  –  was  the  fruit  of  the  post-Second  World  
War  period  only;  the  experience  of  the  totalitarian  regimes  of  the  20th  century  as  well  
as  the  example  of  the  Weimar  Republic45  both  contributed  to  the  reduction  of  the  
definition’s  scope.46  The  latter  personify  a  type  of  resentment  towards  the  democratic  
order,  according  to  which  such  a  settlement  might  at  the  end  of  the  day  turn  out  be  a  
fertile  ground  for  tyranny.47   
 The  realisation  and  the  implementation  of  pluralism  presumes  a  commitment  and  
an  aspiration  –  both  made  on  a  deliberate  decision  –  to  ensure  the  stability,  the  constancy  
and  the  integration  of  a  society.  This  given,  the  pluralist  political  regimes  possess  the  
following  characteristics:  1.  private  interests  are  expressed  through  the  group;  2.  the  
state  dispose  only  of  the  usage  of  (lawful)  coercion,  and  of  the  monopoly  of  legislation,  
provided  that  its  impartiality  is  a  compulsory  condition,  which  ensures  that  no  group  
has  to  experience  negative  and  discriminative  treatment;  3.  political  contention  is  open  
–  both  in  terms  of  finances  and  objectives  –,  thus  anyone  has  the  opportunity  to  
represent  any  case;  4.  in  pluralist  theories  the  state  itself  does  not  appear  as  a  
monolythical  centre  of  power:  instead,  it  is  rather  about  a  continuous  fluctuation  of  
power  between  several  malleable  centres  of  power.  5.  The  final  feature  is  far  from  
being  of  less  importance:  the  quality  democratic  political  processes  and  the  relevant  
political  culture  is  fundamental  –  it  is  supposed  to  gain  general  acceptance,  and  whould  
be  welcome  unanimously.48             
 Although  the  theory  of  pluralist  democracy  was  developed  in  Europe,  its  first  
actual  realisation  can  be  linked  to  the  United  States  of  America.  Based  on  the  American  
                                                             
45 The Weimar Republic was a typical instance, first, of the attempts of democratization between the two World 
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between 1923-29 –, internal tensions were pressing the parliamentary system. With regard to the present thesis, it 
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experience  –  and  also,  on  those  of  European  totalitarian  regimes  –,  and  being  aware  of  
the  scientific  articles  of  European  theorists,  it  was  eventually  Robert  A.  Dahl  who  
created  the  common  (theoretical)  subset  of  pluralist  democracy  and  elite  theory,  under  
the  name  ’polyarchy’.49  Under  such  a  systems,  he  refers  to   
 
“a  regime  in  which  the  right  to  participate  is  broadly  extended  and  the  institutional  guarantees  
to  oppositions  are,  by  historical  standards,  comparatively  strong  and  the-barriers  to  oppositions  
com-  paratively  low.”50 
 
His  concept,  as  it  is,  a  compromise:  a  settlement  inspired  by  his  approach,  would  realise  
the  ideals  of  democracy  according  to  and  depending  on  the  given  sircumstances.51 
 
1.2. Coalitions:  An  elit-given  answer  to  fragmentation52 
Regarding  the  fact  that  both  case  studies  largely  rely  on  the  characterisation  of  its  own  
political  elites,  it  might  be  worth  the  attention  to  spare  some  time  –  although  not  more  
than  is  allowed  hereby  –  attempting  to  explore  the  tradition  of  coalition-formation,  and  
why  ever  turn  to  such  a  solution.  One  may  refer  to  one  of  the  fundamental  features  of  
democracies  functioning  within  the  frames  of  a  consociational  design,  the  electoral  
alliance  of  political  parties.53  Its  importance  comes  without  any  doubt  if  we  suppose  
that  in  such  an  arrangement,  elites  are  responsible  for  the  political  cooperation  of  the  
segments  –  and  if  so,  for  the  continuous  consensus-seeking.     
 As  long  as  consociational  arrangements  prevail  –  rather  rhyming  with  Abraham  
Lincoln’s  Gettysburg  address54  –  the  principle  of  “government  of  the  people,  by  the  
people,  for  the  people”55,  it  is  of  no  surprise,  that  in  the  heyday  of  the  consociational  
order,  governments  tended  to  exceed  the  seats  necessary  to  form  a  government.56  
Andeweg’s  observations  seem  to  confirm  the  legitimacy  of  the  relationship  between  
political  cooperation  and  formation  of  (grand)  coalition:  according  to  these,  the  relaxation  
and  dissolution  of  the  ties  between  pillars,  the  coalitions  themselves  did  not  cease  to  
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50 Dahl, 1978, 197 
51 Lijphart, 1977, 4   
52 Hence in this chapter, the significance and extent of political actors’ role will be underlined, it is to mention at 
the same time, that consociational democracies regularly apply the instrument of depoliticization: therefore, some 
competences of decision-making might be delegated to non-political actors. (Andeweg, 2008, 255)   
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54 The transcript of Abraham Lincoln’s speech is available: voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu.   
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exist,  yet  the  broader  alliances  were  gradually  replaced  by  partnerships  that  barely  
provided  parliamentary  majority.57  Having  discussed  the  coalition  formation  instrument  
of  consociational  cabinets,  it  is  not  without  justification  to  introduce  the  opposition  
excluded  from  governing  position.  Andeweg,  De  Winter  and  Müller  published  an  analysis  
about  opposition  in  consociational  democracies,  in  2008:  in  this  article,  they  point  to  
the  experience  that  these  parties  tend  to  be,  regarding  their  nature,  anti-establishment  
factions.  Their  character  is  well  described,  and  to  a  certain  degree,  determined  by  the  
following  condition:  the  fact  that  the  parties  representing  the  pillars  of  a  society  cover,  
more  or  less,  the  entirety  of  a  society,  results  in  the  small  size  of  the  opposition.  The  
thus-excluded  parties  –  most  of  the  time  without  a  significant  and  reachable,  stable  
electorate  –  have  a  tendency  to  pursue  a  forceful  and  compelling  rhetoric,  perhaps  
lacking  any  other  effective  tool  in  hand,  or  lacking  anything  to  lose  politically.58   
In  any  event,  their  mere  participation  in  the  political  competition  in  itself  has  
affected  the  the  rhetoric  and  the  general  way  established  politics  traditionally  work59  –  
as  we  are  about  to  see  first,  in  the  next  chapter,  and  later  in  the  case  presentations.  As  
will  be  unfolded  on  the  subsequent  pages,  it  might  be  worth  investigating  the  behaviour  
and  performance  of  the  Belgian  (in  fact,  Flemish)  Vlaams  Belang  and  the  Dutch  Partij  
voor  de  Vrijheid  led  by  Geert  Wilders,  from  this  aspect.60  In  the  course  of  the  last  
century,  parties  representing  the  segments  –  in  effect,  traditional  participants  of  political  
competition  –  have  been  sidelined.  In  the  mirror  of  depillarisation,  it  is  thus  not  to  be  
held  a  surprising  development,  that  the  Parti  Socialiste  –  traditionally  popular  in  Wallonia  
–  is  not  taking  part  in  the  incumbent  federal  government.61  As  well,  the  former  Dutch  
government  (that  was,  the  Second  Rutte  cabinet)  involved  two  parties  only  –  the  
Volkspartij  voor  Vrijheid  en  Democratie  and  the  Partij  van  de  Arbeid  –,  excluding  
completely,  denominational  factions,  among  others.62  Now  that  the  ‘old’  appeal  of  
consociationalism  might  be  fading  away,  it  seems  viable  to  suggest  that  coalitions,  today,  
are  called  into  being  according  to  different  instinctives.63   
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59 Cammaerts, 2018, 14 
60 It is important to mention here, that in the PVV’s case, we will focus on the anti-Islam agenda, however, we will 
not be discussing the same stream of Vlaams Belang; in the latter case, instead, we will restrict our attention to the 
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de-gouvernement; for the coalition agreement of the former Dutch cabinet, see: 
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2. Defining  populism   
As  a  survey  on  the  results  of  national  elections  in  Europe,  conducted  by  The  Guardian,  
concluded:  (predominantly)  right-wing  populist  parties  have  tripled  their  electoral  support  
in  the  last  two  decades,  resulted  by  a  consistent  increase  since  1998.64  In  this  regard,  
the  Low  Countries  are  not  exceptions  –  they  are  rather  the  rules.  The  dynamics  between  
Flanders  and  Wallonia  have  been  divergent  –  or  centrifugal,  as  is  usually  the  term  of  
political  science  in  the  case  of  divided  societes  –  recently,  thus  the  gap  between  the  
Northern  and  Southern  half  of  the  country  has  been  deepening.65  The  level  of  distrust  
that  the  Dutch  population  has  in  the  political  elite,  has  considerably  increased,  lately.66  
Meanwhile,  both  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  have  facing  struggling  with  the  adverse  
effects  of  the  economic  crisis.67  Certainly,  there  is  more  to  explore  in  the  populists’  
“unorthodox  appeal,”68  these  factors  are  yet  believed  to  contribute  to  the  salient  electoral  
success  of  regionalist  or  populist  parties.   
Taking  the  considerably  heightened  emotions  of  contemporary  populism  into  
account,  it  is  of  no  surprise  that  numerous  theorists  have  up  to  our  day  tried  to  give  
a  more  or  less  comprehensive  definition  in  order  to  grasp  the  character  of  the  populist  
state  of  mind.  In  this  vein  of  scholarly  works,  Müller’s  volume  is  a  very  sharp-eyed  
introduction.  On  the  pages  of  his  book  –  What  Is  Populism?,  published  in  2016  –,  he  
interprets  the  relation  between  the  people  and  the  elite  as  a  sharp  clash  between  two  
fundamentally  different,  but  in  themselves  monolithic  camps.  Their  confrontation  is  of  a  
principled  and  moral  nature;  at  the  same  time,  is  based  on  an  extremely  simplified  
notion:  in  their  concept,  the  self-interested  and  corrupt  elite  stands  against  “the  people”  
–  the  “morally  pure  and  fully  unified”  entity.69  While  the  former  supposedly  lacks  the  
crucial  democratic  legitimacy,  the  latter  suffers  from  the  absence  of  proper  and  sufficient  
representation.  Not  else  than  the  liberal  democratic  order  seems  to  be  blamed  for  that,  
for  the  its  institutional  features  tend  to  “undermine  the  proper  implementation  of  the  
general  will.”70  Acting  in  the  name  of  popular  will  –  thus  giving  the  latter  what  it  has  
an  organic  and  undoubted  right  for  –,  that  is  what  gives  impetus  to  a  populist  politician  
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or  movement.  Concerning  the  people  themselves  to  represent,  the  lines  between  the  true  
and  authentic  people  –  whom  deserve  exclusive  representation  –  and  all  the  others  apart  
from  the  former,  are  necessarily  artificial  –  and  not  less  importantly,  potentially  
dangerous.71  Ivan  Krastev  refers  to  the  populist  threat  as  the  possibility  “that  society  
falls  into  two  homogeneous  and  antagonistic  groups.”72 
From  the  above-mentioned  assumptions,  three  features  can  be  drawn  the  
simultaneous  existence  of  which  makes  populist  politics  fundamentally  different  from  the  
practices  and  principles  of  the  mainstream  political  arrangements.  These  are,  namely:  
antielitism,  antipluralism  and  an  overall  aversion  towards  not  less  than  the  entire  political  
establishment.73  Through  the  lenses  of  populist  politicians,  people  are  seen  as  –  according  
to  Canovan’s  words  –  the  one  and  only  “rightful  source  of  legitimate  power”74  –  
however,  their  definition  of  people  is  constructed,  hence  artificial.  As  well,  their  position  
is  the  following:  they  stand  with  the  “forgotten  mass  of  ordinary  people,”75  and  against  
the  political  establishment,  which  is  generally  viewed  as  an  elitist  body  of  politicians,  
who  have  been  in  a  distance  from  the  ‘true’  citizens  and  their  everyday  problems.   
As  we  have  pointed  it  out  earlier,  populism  might  well  be  inherent  to  the  current  
–  predominantly  representative  –  form  of  democracy,  it  seems  arguable  to  devote  some  
more  thoughts  to  the  nature  of  their  contentious  relation.76  Müller  organized  the  elements  
in  which  cases  populism  and  democracy  inevitably  clash,77  but  concludes  with  an  
observation  which  will  make  his  readers  think  that  the  “populist  instinct”78  goes  against  
rationality.  Namely,  he  finds  that  “[w]hat  distinguishes  democratic  politicians  from  
populists  is  that  the  former  make  representative  claims  in  the  form  of  something  like  
hypotheses  that  can  be  empirically  disproven  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  results  of  regular  
procedures  and  institutions  like  elections.”  And  since  “their  claim  is  of  a  moral  and  
symbolic  –  not  an  empirical  –  nature,  it  cannot  be  disproven.”  Hence,  populist  politicians  
are  likely  to  stick  with  their  ideas,  in  the  face  of  everything,  no  matter  how  it  is  
attempted  to  refute  their  arguments.79   
Concerning  the  ideological  course,  populism  –  again  –  does  not  prove  to  be  a  
simple  case.  Although  ending  with  an  ’ism’,  populism  is  not  similar  to  liberalism,  
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73 Müller, 2016, 19 
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75 Ibid 
76 Huber & Schimpf, 2017, 146 
77 Müller, 2016, 77-78 
78 The expression is Amichai Magen’s own. (Magen, 2018, 122) 




socialism  or  conservatism,  since  it  lacks  a  systematic  and  consistent  ideological  
framework.  Ben  Stanley  in  his  2008  article  merely  exempts  the  positioning  of  populism  
on  the  ideological  spectrum  which  is  taken  as  a  basis  of  our  political  thinking,  by  
raising  that  populism  as  it  is  “should  be  regarded  as  a  distinct  ideology,”  regarding  the  
fact  that  it  posseses  “a  particular  way  of  construing”  interactions.80  Without  bringing  in  
the  verdict  here,  we  might  conclude,  that  at  best,  there  is  no  populism  –  instead,  there  
are  populisms.  Arguing  that  the  two  populist  movements  under  question  are  far  from  
being  uniform,  we  will  return  to  the  comparison  of  their  circumstances  and  character  in  
the  Conclusion.81     
 
 
                                                             
80 Stanley, 2008, 95 
81 It is important to call the attention to the following restriction: in the VB’s case, we will exclusively discuss – 
hereby we will not touch upon the party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, although we are aware of the fact that the 
movement first gained momentum with its anti-integration and anti-Islam stances. However, we have to underline, 
that the main aim of the present thesis is not the comparison of the immigration policies of Belgium (or Flanders, 




BELGIUM:  LESSONS  OF  A  CONSOCIONATIONAL  FEDERATION 
 
Introduction   
 
“The  recent  decade  marks  a  radicalisation  in  the  dynamics  of  regionalised  party  
competition,  increasingly  ending  in  stalemate.”82  This  is  the  very  first  sentence  in  André  
and  Depauw’s  account  of  the  latest  Belgian  federal  elections  in  2014.  In  their  article,  
the  authors  suggest  that  tensions  did  not  seem  to  soften  in  the  country  which  had  been  
not  only  federalized  by  the  1990s,  but  also,  the  subnational  level  has  since  had  a  
number  of  still  broadening  policy  fields  to  take  care  of.         
Indeed,  what  since  has  happened,  could  not  disprove  of  it.  In  an  interview  given  
to  the  VRT  television  channel  in  January  2016,  Liesbeth  Homans  –  politician  of  the  
New  Flemish  Alliance  (henceforward:  N-VA)  and  the  Vice-Minister-President  of  the  
Flemish  government  –  stated  that  while  she  finds  2020  too  close,  she  hopes  Belgium  
to  “cease  to  exist”  by  2025.83  On  the  following  day,  Bart  de  Wever,  the  party’s  leader  
commented  Homans’  words  by  saying:  he  would  (rather)  avoid  to  tie  the  developments  
to  dates.  It  is  important  to  regard  the  upcoming  elections  in  May  201984  –  the  leaked  
extract  of  the  interview  could  even  be  held  to  be  campaign  rhetoric  (although,  quite  an  
early  one).  Hence,  it  will  soon  be  time  for  the  Belgian  parties  –  and  not  only  the  
Flemish,  but  also  the  Walloon  political  groupings  –  to  finally  take  sides  on  how  they  
see  Belgium’s  administrational  future:  that  is,  whether  they  envision  confederalization  –  
the  further  expansion  of  the  federational  arrangement  –,  or  the  secession  of  Flanders  
which  would  bring  with  itself  the  dissolution  of  Belgium  as  a  federation.85             
It  would  not  be  surprising  at  all,  if  Homans  were  to  give  an  early  foretaste  of  
the  ideas  of  the  N-VA.  The  Paris  events  in  201586  with  no  doubt  intensified  the  
sentiments  of  the  Flemish  separatists:  namely,  following  the  horrible  attack  in  the  French  
capital,  the  separatist  rhetoric  was  complemented  by  a  rather  confident  element.  Jan  
                                                             
82 André & Depauw, 2015, 228 
83 Cerulus, 2016 
84 That is, namely: the representatives of the subnational and federal level, and the delegates to the European 
Parliament will be elected on the same day.  
85 One factor against (any further) division – although the real degree of his influence is questionable – is the king 
himself, traditionally viewed as the symbol of the Belgian unity; Albert II followed his father on the thrown in 
1993, who could thus be the monarch of a federal Belgium, and was succeeded by his son, by Philip in 2013. The 
current king reacted to the March events in a video, in which he expressed a commitment to stand up against the 
threats in unity. The video and the transcript is available: Dhnet.be. 




Jambon,  the  Minister  for  Security  and  Internal  Affairs  in  the  current  federal  government87  
once  referred  to  the  success  of  the  Flemish  leadership  in  Antwerp  –  of  which  the  Mayor  
is  Bart  De  Wever  himself  –  in  handling  the  challenges  in  relation  with  the  Jihadists.88    
His  acknowledgment,  certainly,  should  not  lead  us  to  far-reaching  conclusions,  however,  
his  words  could  be  understood  as  someone’s  completely  convinced  of  the  capability  of  
the  Flemish  elite  in  showing  the  entire  country  how  such  situations  should  be  managed.89     
It  may  easily  happen  that  the  –  now  serial  –  failures  in  forming  a  central  
government  are  symptoms  and  expressions  of  a  certain  irreconcilable  antagonism.  It  is  
notable,  that  having  waited  for  a  total  of  737  days  for  the  central  Belgian  government  
to  come  into  office90  in  2007-2008,  first  and  later,  in  2010-2011,  the  latest  elections  in  
2014  were  also  followed  by  a  four-month  vacuum  in  the  seats  of  the  central  executive  
power.  Furthermore,  with  the  widely-supported  N-VA  withdrawing  from  the  federal  
executive  coalition,  the  country  has  been  conducted  by  a  minority  caretaker  government  
since  mid-December  2018  –  and  is,  at  the  same  time,  at  the  brink  of  the  upcoming  
elections.91  The  more  and  more  obvious  hardships  of  successful  cooperation  between  the  
segments  of  society  raises  up  some  questions,  one  which  could  easily  be  the  following:  
may  it  be  possible,  that  the  usage  of  the  consociational  tools  is  not  more  than  a  mere  
–  Kris  Deschouwer  once  put  it  –  “institutional  obligation”92?  If  so,  might  the  essential  
will  and  eagerness  of  political  elites  to  cooperate  be  fading  away?  At  any  rate,  the  fact  
that  secessionist  tensions  have  disturbed  the  peace  and  stability  of  a  country  which  is  
generally  seen  as  the  capital  of  the  European  unity,  definitely  draws  the  attention  to  the  
Belgian  democracy.93   
The  subsequent  chapters  of  the  paper  undertake  a  dual  task:  on  the  hand,  they  
review  the  process  of  devolution  which  –  through  the  six  constitutional  reforms  –  led  
the  Belgian  unitary  state  to  the  Belgian  Federation.  (In  fact,  this  is  the  core  of  the  
                                                             
87 At the time of writing (April 2019), the federal government was not functioning anymore; Belgium was then 
led by a caretaker government. (Cerulus, 2018) 
88 Traynor, 2015 
89 Interestingly, however, the „slip of the tongue” in January 2016 is not without precedent or context: in December 
2006, in a programme – in the making of which Belgian politicians, too, took part – on a Frenh-language channel 
in Belgium, viewers ear-witnessed a statement on Flanders’ independence. The political hoax was followed by 
chaos and panic, which could only be eased by persistent comments and statements given for several weeks by 
journalists and politicians. (Bangó, 2009, 136) 
90 Cendrowicz, 2014; Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2015, 282 
91 As regards the N-VA’s exit, they were not willing to provide their support for the United Nations’ migration 
pact. (Cereulus, 2018) 
92 Deschouwer, 2006, 901 
93 Looking from one step further, taking the broader European context into consideration, we can conclude that 
the European subnational entities were given more latitude in the 1990s. Since this time, accordingly, they have 
had more channels – the Council of Ministers and the Committee of the Regions – to transmit their opinion about 




underlying  paradox  of  keeping  the  country  together,  as  it  is,  and  the  ability  of  the  
segments’  accommodation.)  On  the  other  hand,  they  introduce  the  Belgian  political  elite  
as  the  ‘conductor’  of  the  Walloon-Flemish  coexistence  –  and  of  course,  that  of  the  
federalization.  The  former  analysis  supposes  the  continual  change  of  the  central  
government’s  role,  insofar  as  the  subnational  entities  were  gradually  moving  away.  The  
latter  aspect  is  discussed  predominantly  in  two  aspects.  First,  in  terms  of  the  role  that  
each  party  or  party  family  have  played  in  the  political  scene,  and  which  position  these  
entities  represented  during  the  federalization  process,  besides  how  each  of  them  has  felt  
towards  the  Flemish-Walloon  cooperation  and  coexistence.  Second,  regarding  the  role  
played  by  the  right-wing  populist  Flemish  Interest  (abbreviation:  VB).  All  the  above,  
with  strict  regard  to  consociationalism  being  evermore  the  instrument  of  the  balancing  
between  diverse  interests,  the  compromise  and  consensus  between  the  pillars  of  the  
fragmented  political  system,  and  thus,  as  the  mitigation  of  the  tangible  tension  in  the  
Belgian  society.  The  relationship  between  the  Dutch-speaking  Northern  and  the  French-
speaking  Southern  part  of  the  country  has  traditionally  been  charged  with  mutual  hostility  
and  strain.  However,  the  new  millennium  had  already  added  some  more  elements  to  the  






I.   Consociationalism  in  Belgium:  The  test  of  the  Flemish-Walloon  
coexistence 
Although  the  paper  below  focuses  on  the  populist  challenge  in  consociational  contexts,  
in  this  case,  provided  that  consociationalism  gets  a  role  in  the  context  of  the  Flemish-
Walloon  coexistence,  and  that  the  developments  of  the  19th  century  lived  on  continuously  
in  the  practice  of  accommodation  in  the  subsequent  century,  it  is  worth  the  attention  to  
have  a  look  at  its  beginnings.   
Belgium  is  often  perceived  as  a  divided  country  due  to  the  Flemish-Walloon  
conflict  –  it  is  however  important  to  note  that  back  at  the  time  of  gaining  independence  
from  the  United  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  in  1830,  there  was  nothing  of  a  hostility  
between  the  two  constitutive  units  of  the  country.94  Moreover,  due  both  to  the  distrust  
towards  the  Northern  Low  Countries  and  to  the  “conviction  of  the  Belgians’  own  
national  identity,”95  during  the  15  years  of  being  forced  to  live  under  the  Dutch  king’s  
command,  a  unified  resistance  was  urged  throughout  the  country.96  The  immediate  
aftermath  of  the  revolution  was  characterized  by  the  atmosphere  of  consociationalism:  
that  was,  the  alliance  of  the  traditional  noblemen,  the  church,  the  industry  and  commerce,  
and  finally,  the  intellectuals.  It  might  have  been  the  placating  tone  and  the  inclination  
for  cooperation  that  Arend  Lijphart  sensed;  he  originates  the  Belgian  consociationalism  
from  the  political  practice  of  the  early  19th  century.97  Notwithstanding,  it  shortly  became  
obvious  that  as  soon  as  the  Dutch  supremacy  came  to  an  end  –  predominantly  and  
widely  felt  as  oppression  –,  following  a  short  period  of  peaceful  interaction,  the  liberal-
Catholic  unity  began  to  decay,  and  accordingly,  the  subsequent  decades  of  the  19th  
century  witnessed  the  unfolding  political  opposition  of  these  once-allied  groups.98  During  
this  period,  the  aspirations  of  the  Flemish  half  of  the  country  were  the  first  to  realize  
                                                             
94 At least, it did not play a significant part (role?) in the newborn constitutional monarchy’s politics. (Bardi, 2001, 
175) 
95 Erdődy, 2010, 1 
96 That is to say, the strategic order of the Holy Alliance led Belgium to a monarchy common with the Netherlands, 
in 1815, given the necessity of a powerful neighbouring entity had France broken the rules laid in the discussions 
which followed the Napoleonic wars. William I as the then-monarch of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands 
intended to introduce the Dutch system in his land – an intention which was experienced as oppression by the 
Belgian population. (Szűcs, 2005, 37; Erdődy, 2010, 2) 
97 Arend Lijphart – agreeing with Val R. Lorwin – refers to the liberal-Catholic union as one of the purest, most 
typical instance of consociational democracy. (Lijphart, 1968, 212) Nonetheless, Kris Deschouwer in a 2006 article 
of his reached the following somewhat opposing conclusion: consociationalism was more revealing before the 
process of federalisation than after that, since deciding on federalising the country itself is the proof that the 
Flemish and the Walloon portions of society were willing to get further from each other. (Deschouwer, 2006, 896)   




in  a  movement  basically  of  Catholic  character,  organized  to  standardize  their  language  
and  also  to  render  it  equal  with  French.99  The  organization  of  the  Flemish  side  was  at  
the  same  time,  a  key  moment  for  the  Walloons  as  well,  since  their  movement  in  the  
South  in  the  1870s  could  be  understood  as  a  reaction  to  the  articulating  and  gradually  
strengthening  Flemish  identity  in  the  North.  However,  while  the  bond  between  the  
Flemish  movement100  and  the  Catholic  Church  was  a  shared  and  common  element,  
potentially  catalyzing  the  community’s  unity,  the  Walloons  were  lacking  such  a  thing  
due  to  the  anti-clerical  and  liberal  features  of  the  Walloon  movement.101  Again,  the  
opposition  of  the  Flemish  and  Walloon  community,  at  first  of  cultural  and  linguistic  
character,  began  to  materialize  following  the  gaining  of  independence  from  the  Dutch  
domination,  and  to  deepen  at  the  end  of  the  19th  century.102         
Consociationalism  as  the  deliberately  applied  tool  of  conflict-resolution  first  
appeared  in  1918,  in  possession  of  the  experience  of  the  First  World  War.103  The  then-
reigning  Albert  I  succeeded  in  arranging  the  three  traditional  links  of  the  political  elite  
around  one  table,  in  the  hope  of  finding  a  common  solution  for  the  obvious  and  tangible  
intersegmental  tensions.  The  negotiations  were  finalized  with  the  Loppem  Agreements,  
which  could  well  be  contemplated  as  the  zero  point  of  the  consociational  order,  
considering  that  they  secured  the  right  for  self-organization  for  the  different  sections  of  
society.104   
After  one  long  century  –  and  two  world  wars  –,  the  Flemish  movement  gained  
momentum  again:  this  time  in  the  1960s,  the  ambitions  of  the  Flemish  were  underpinned  
by  their  significantly  and  vigorously  developing  economic  performance.  What  is  more,  
in  possession  of  the  universal  suffrage,  their  demographic  advantage  also  could  
materialize  in  political  representation.105  At  the  same  time,  it  resulted  in  a  widespread  
                                                             
99 Following the First World War, the Flemish movement broadened its scope: after 1918 it aimed its activity at 
forming and establishing „an independent Flemish subnational identity”. (Keszthelyi, 2009, 92-93) 
100 It is a curiosity that the expression ’Flemish’ covered the habitants of the Low Lands, until the end of the 18th 
century. (Karsai, 1986, 47) 
101 Keszthelyi, 2009, 93-94 
102 Ignáth, 2002, 173 
103 In addition to the significant material losses, the warfare amplified the political tension: in that chaotic scenery, 
the Flemish envisioned the opportunity to gain their autonomy, hence they benefited from the Germans’ help and 
with that, founded a Dutch-speaking university. Due to the unpleasant memory of the German assistance, however, 
the case of the Flemish independence settled for while. (Kossmann-Putto & Kossmann, 1998, 51) 
104 Deschouwer, 2012, 6 
105 In 1955, the Walloon industrial production was still ahead of the Flemish one – yet one decade later, the 
industrial productivity per capita was more prosperous in Flanders. (Barsi, 2001, 177) It is well-known that the 
World Wars caused serious destruction in Belgium. The country joined the European Coal and Steel Community 
negotiations in 1950; Belgium has traditionally been dependent of the heavy industry, and in the period following 
the Second World War, on the export of such products, as well. The country was the trading partner simultaneously 
of France and of Germany, and as such, Belgium potentially had the chance to lessen the tension between the two 




fear  of  a  potential  Flemish  dominance  within  the  Walloon  community  which  was  falling  
behind  in  economic  efficiency,  and  which,  at  the  same  time,  was  a  demographic  
minority.106  In  this  frustrating  atmosphere,  the  tension  between  the  social  segments  
manifested  twice  in  the  post-war  period,  until  1958:  first,  the  return  of  the  Belgian  king  
to  the  thrown,  and  second,  the  again  relevant  school  question,  both  preparing  the  fiasco  
around  the  Catholic  University  of  Leuven.107  Different  reactions  were  given  by  the  
Flemish  and  the  Walloon  movement,  and  they  approached  the  imminent  federalism  from  
diverse  aspects,  articulating  different  aspirations.  While  the  Flemish  group  demanded  
linguistic  and  cultural  autonomy,  the  Walloons  insisted  on  the  establishment  of  regions  
organized  according  to  the  territorial  principle,  and  thus  urged  regional  autonomy  in  
which  they  foresaw  the  solution  to  the  economic  recession  of  the  Southern  parts  of  
Belgium.  To  the  former,  the  formation  of  communities,  and  to  the  latter,  that  of  regions  
was  the  response,  both  within  the  process  of  federalization.108 
Since  the  case  study  on  Belgium  basically  focuses  on  the  ethnical  differences  of  
the  two  societal  segments,  we  will  confine  ourselves  to  give  not  more  than  a  short  
outline  of  the  Belgian  pillar  system  founded  on  a  denominational  and  ideological  basis.109  
The  essential  feature  of  the  Catholic  pillar  was  a  strict  “Church-centrism,”  which  owned  
a  broad  net  of  institutions  with  schools110,  nursery  homes  and  hospitals  in  it.  The  
socialist  pillar  relied  heavily,  first,  on  the  movement  of  industrial  workers,  and  later  –  
having  organized  political  representation  –  on  the  Socialist  Party.111  The  liberals,  however,  
did  not  participate  in  the  political  scene  as  a  mass  movement;  the  liberal  trade  union,  
the  organizations  of  social  security  and  their  cultural  associations  were  not  absorbed  into  
                                                             
economic competitivity already in the 1950s: here the mainstream concept of the industrial renewal was one based 
primarily on machines, which foreshadowed a more severe level of unemployment. In contrast, new, modern 
industries – such as the car industry, the chemical industry and the electronics – took roots in the Flemish territories. 
In addition, the Walloon economic fallback was stimulated by the fact that by the mid-20th century, Flanders had 
become more attractive to foreign investments. A key development in this period was that the economic dominance 
passed in the hands of Flanders. The declining Walloon economy thus could expect help not only from the Walloon 
investors, but also from the central government, but at the end of the day, neither of them turned out to be a source 
of help; the latter showed neither the capability, nor the inclination in making structural changes in the Southern 
part of the country. (Kossmann-Putto & Kossmann, 1998, 43-53; Swenden & Jans, 2006, 878; Ignáth, 2002, 183) 
106 Deschouwer, 2009, 561 
107 For more on these developments: see Chapter III. 
108 Swenden & Jans, 2006, 881 
109 Such inquiries have been encouraged by Andeweg, De Winter and Müller: in their point of view, Belgium – 
due to its dual division – is going through two parallel, somewhat opposing processes: while the social class and 
the religious pillar have been fading away, the cleavage around the linguistic segments of society has become even 
more significant – and it continues to do so. (Andeweg et al., 2008, 79) 
110 The state’s participation in the financial support of the parochial schools was going to be a central element of 
the conflict between the socialists and the Catholics in the course of the 20th century – but for a more detailed 
introduction of this, see the upcoming chapters of the paper. 
111 At the dawn of the 20th century, the Belgian left-wing viewed the reformist principles as normative: as a 
representative of this did Emile Vandervelde function, who – in terms of his background – was a member of the 




a  well-organized  system  of  institutions.  Similarly,  they  did  not  run  their  own  schools:  
they  traditionally  supported  state  schools  instead  of  parochial  ones.112  In  conclusion,  the  
conflict  which  has  divided  Belgium  for  more  than  one  and  a  half  century  is  fed  by  
two  sources:113  on  the  one  hand,  the  regional  economic  disparities  of  the  North  and  
South,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  dominance  of  the  French  language.114  The  confrontation  
of  the  two  Belgian  segments  is  therefore  to  be  comprehended  in  an  economic  and  
political  dimension. 
  
                                                             
112 Deschouwer, 2012, 7 
113 According to the available literature, one of the most crucial questions in connection with the conflict is to find 
out what happened between the Dutch- (Flemish-) and the French-speaking communities; another would focus on 
explaining and suggesting solutions to it. Regarding the zero point of the conflict, the theorists have approached 
the above-mentioned questions in two ways: certain believe that the development of the 1960s mean the beginning 
of rivalry, while others claim that what happened almost 60 years ago, was not more than the manifestation of a 
process originating in the 19th century. (Huyse, 1981, 107-108)  
114 The lingua franca of the small elite was, in fact, French (under Napoleon, the Southern part of the Low Lands 
witnessed a forceful Frenchification); however, according to the results of the first census in 1846, 57% of the 





II. The  way  towards  the  federalized  settlement 
Originally,  the  1831  constitution  of  the  independent  Belgium  –  the  “charter  of  
unionism”115,  coined  by  Erdődy  –  designed  a  unified,  yet  decentralized  state.  Although  
it  could  only  remain  so,  as  long  as  the  political  and  social  structures  themselves  were  
characterized  by  homogeneity.116  Accordingly,  in  subsequent  times,  the  social  dynamics  
had  driven  the  political  elites  representing  the  Flemish  and  Walloon  segments  of  society  
by  the  mid-20th  century,  to  step  on  the  way  of  a  slow  and  gradual  process  of  
federalization  at  the  end  of  which  Belgium  stands  before  us  as  an  asymmetric  federation  
with  a  truly  complicated  structure.117  In  any  event,  without  knowing  if  Belgium  would  
actually  transform  into  a  confederation  or  whether  it  will  eventually  go  on  as  a  federation,  
it  stands  without  any  doubt  that  a  clearer  differentiation  of  the  competences  of  the  
Communities  and  Regions  should  be  made,  perhaps  following  another  (European)  federal  
state’s  example.  Doing  so  would  ensure  a  more  transparent  organisation  and  a  viable  
administration,  so  that  there  would  be  a  way  leading  out  of  the  “Belgian  labyrinth.”118  
As  we  are  about  to  see,  there  are  two  distinct  groups  of  the  Belgian  State  Reforms:  
four  reforms  before  and  two  reforms  after  the  development  of  Belgium  turning  into  a  
federal  state.   
 According  to  the  first  constitutional  reform  of  1970,  the  hitherto  unitary  legislature  
was  replaced  by  two  legislative  bodies,  separated  on  the  basis  of  language,  both  of  
which  exercised  power  through  decrees.119  The  State  Reform  divided  the  two  linguistic  
communities  on  the  level  of  the  political  elite,  as  well:  accordingly,  each  elected  member  
of  the  Parliament  was  obliged  to  represent  exclusively  the  members  his  or  her  own  
community.120  The  constitutional  reform,  avoiding  every  form  of  discrimination,  
introduced  certain  measurements  of  minority  protection121,  all  of  which  are  consociational  
                                                             
115 The National Congress the Belgian constitution approved of in February 1831 was the outcome of the 
compromise of several groups of the society: namely, it could be claimed to be the compromise of the Catholics 
and liberals – thus, the Church and the state –, as well as that of the Flemish and Walloon population. The quoted 
expression is Gábor Erdődy’s and was found in the author’s 2010 article. (Erdődy, 2010, 9) 
116 Alen & Ergec, 1994, 5-11 
117 Swenden, 2002 
118 The Belgian poet Geert Van Istendael wrote his book under the estimated title ’The Belgian Labyrinth’ in 1989, 
originally titled as: Het Belgisch labyrint: de schoonheid der wanstaltigheid.  
119 Belgian Federal Government, n. i. 
120 Although the representatives of the bilingual Bruxelles-Halle-Vilvoorde constituency were free to decide which 
group they intended to belong to. (Deschouwer, 2009, 902) 





instruments:  the  double  majority122,  the  principle  of  parity123  and  –  to  prevent  the  French-
speaking  community  from  negative  treatment  –  the  ‘alarm  bell  procedure’124  were  hereby  
the  standards  of  legislation.  For  the  purpose  of  the  reached  compromise,  the  Flemish  
(nationalists)  were  given  the  opportunity  of  cultural  federalism,  and  –  in  turn  –  the  
foundations  of  the  Regions  were  laid  as  requested  by  the  Walloon  population.125  Also,  
the  agreement  organized  regionalization  on  a  territorial  basis,  as  well  as  provided  
economic  independence  for  the  resulting  constituent  subnational  units.126  The  second  
State  Reform127  –  developed  in  1980  –  referred  to  the  subnational  units  (hitherto  cited  
as  ’cultural  communities’)  as  Communities128,  which  were  provided  by  a  legislative  (the  
Council),  and  an  executive  body  (community  governments).  The  second  amendment  
continued  the  regulation  of  the  regional  level  of  state:  within  its  meaning,  the  Flemish  
and  Walloon  Regions  were  established,  setting  up  Council  and  a  government  for  both.129 
 While  the  1980  Reform  remained  without  any  provision  concerning  the  status  of  
Brussels,  the  1988  package  of  amendments  dealt  primarily  with  that:  the  third  State  
Reform  ensured  the  establishment  of  regional  institutions  (a  Council  –  later,  a  Parliament  
–  and  a  government)  for  Brussels.  Accordingly,  the  capital  carries  out  tasks  in  a  regional  
and  a  metropolitan  scope.130  Besides,  the  competences  of  the  Communities  and  Regions  
broadened.131  One  of  the  unprecedented  developments  of  the  Belgian  devolution  is  that  
the  subnational  elements  obtained  the  right  to  make  international  agreements  in  their  
competence.  For  the  foreign  policy  guidelines  and  principles,  the  central  government  
                                                             
122 The principle determined a high treshold in terms of the constitutional reforms: on one hand, two-thirds of all 
the members of the Parliament, on the other hand, the majorities of every linguistic groups had to support in order 
for it to come into force. (Deschouwer, 2009, 902) 
123 Accordingly, the same number of either French- and Dutch-speaking representatives had to participate in the 
central government’s work – not counting, however, the Prime Minister. (Swenden, 2002, 76) 
124 For the purpose of the instrument – applied in one case only, so far –, if at least 25% of the representatives of a 
linguistic group judges an initiative dangerous or harmful regardin his or her community, they have the right to 
“ring” the alarm bell. (Deschouwer, 2009, 902) 
125 Thirdly, the unionists were appeased by being told that these measurements meant no harm to Belgium’s unity.  
126 De Winter & Baudewyns, 2009, 288 
127 A part of its background is that – having failed to reach an agreement in some cases (including the status of the 
capital), and that the cultural communities already were in entitled to decide not only on cultural issues, but also 
on those related with healthcare and social affairs – the debate on language usage and the constitutional quarrels 
accelerated already in that decade. (Karsai, 1986, 153) 
128 These are the following: the Flemish Community, the French-speaking Community and the German-speaking 
Community. (Ignáth, 2002, 174) 
129 The regional institutions of Flanders soon merged with those of the Flemish Community, thus since 1980, a 
common Council (later: Parliament) and government represented Flanders’ interests. In spite of this, the French-
speaking population never made such a decision: the institutions of the Walloon Region and those of the French-
speaking Community have been separate up to now. (Keszthelyi, 2009, 97) 
130 Ignáth, 2002, 174 
131 According to the modification, the communal level is in charge of education, as well; the Regions obtained 




was  in  charge.132  The  first  phase  of  the  State  Reforms  –  that  is,  the  federalizing  one  –  
came  to  an  end  with  the  fourth  Reform  –  to  be  more  precise,  with  the  1992  Accord  
de  la  St.  Michel.133  Hence,  Belgium  had  developed  into  a  federal  state  by  1993134,  
fundamentally  characterised  by  centrifugality,  the  bipolar  nature  and  the  greater  
significance  of  the  territorial  rather  than  the  personal  principle.135  In  the  case  of  Belgium,  
a  country  traditionally  divided  by  economic  disparities,  it  is  worth  mentioning  hereby  
the  provision  which  regionalized  international  trade.136  In  addition,  it  is  also  a  relevant  
development  in  terms  of  international  participation,  that  their  international  competences  
were  enumerated  and  fixed  in  the  fourth  State  Reform.137  One  of  the  sources  of  the  
fifth  State  Reform  was  the  Lambermont  Agreement,  the  merit  of  which  was  the  
delegation  of  some  additional  competences  –  in  the  field  of  agriculture,  fishing  and  
foreign  trade  –  to  the  Regions  and  Communities.  Aditionally,  more  financial  responsibility  
–  along  with  a  broader  scope  of  competences  –  was  handed  over  to  the  subnational  
units  (e.g.  Regions  were  in  charge  of  tax  collection).138  The  Reform  also  outlined  some  
provisions  concerning  the  funding  of  Communities.139  The  Lombard  Agreement,  as  the  
other  source  of  the  2001  amendment  adjusted  the  Brussels  institutions.140 
 Following  rapid  changes  of  government  and  some  lengthy  negotiations  on  forming  
the  government141,  as  the  result  of  a  political  consensus,  the  sixth  State  reform  was  
eventually  drafted  during  the  fall  of  2011.  The  “Butterfly  Agreement”  (in  Dutch:  
Vlinderakkoord;  in  French:  L’accord  papillon)  –  which  was  reached  by  eight  parties,  
Elio  Di  Rupo  being  the  Prime  Minister  at  the  time  –  is  a  groups  of  reformist  provisions  
of  a  variety  of  scope.142  As  an  undoubtedly  momentous  development,  one  of  the  neuralgic  
                                                             
132 However, it is a feature of the Belgian practice that during international negotiations – to the “outside” – to 
represent a unified stand. (Keszthelyi, 2009, 97) 
133 As it were to approve of the state’s federal structure, the central government has been referred to as federal 
since this development. (Alen & Ergec, 1994, 60) 
134 The first article of the constitution’s original text declares that “Belgium is comprised of provinces” (The 
document is available on the following link: http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/be1831.htm), whilst the same article 
of its 1994 version affirms, that “Belgium is a federal state, which is comprised of communities and regions.” 
(Alen & Ergec, 1994, 64) Its subnational elements are the following: the Flemish, French-speaking and Dutch-
speaking Communities, and beside those, Flanders, Wallonia and the Region of the capital Brussels. (Barsi, 2001, 
181) 
135 Kőváriné Ignáth, 2009, 209 
136 Ignáth, 2002, 174 
137 Keszthelyi, 2009, 97 
138 Kőváriné Ignáth, 2009, 210-211 
139 Belgian Federal Government: n. i. 
140 According to this, the Brussels members of the Flemish Parliament are elected directly. Furthermore, the 
legislation of capital Brussels is bound to get a majority in both linguistic communities for the administrative 
provisions on the regional level. (Belgian Federal Government n. i.; Keszthelyi, 2009, 97) 
141 As is known, prior to the sixth State Reform, Belgium had a considerate difficulty in forming a government 
following the federal elections, first in 2007, and then in 2010.  




cases  in  Belgian  politics  was  achieved  a  solution  to.  Thus,  above  certain  legal  and  
administrative  modifications,  the  crucial  point  of  the  sixth  Reform  was  the  division  of  
the  Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde  constituency  into  Flemish  Brabant  and  Brussels  comprising  
of  19  municipalities.143  By  the  same  token,  some  long-standing  political  taboos  were  
touched  upon  for  the  first  time  –  to  the  Walloons’  greatest  regret:  the  most  significant  
of  these  was  the  decentralisation  of  certain  areas  of  social  security  (i.e.  family  
allowances).144  The  Agreement  received  altogether  diverse  reactions:  some  –  including  
Goossens  and  Cannoot  –  argue  that  the  sixth  State  Reform  was  rather  a  progress  in  the  
discussion  on  the  (con)federal  state  structure  –  and  as  such,  a  potential  step  towards  
the  seventh  State  Reform  –,  than  the  closure  of  such  a  debate.145   
Concluding  the  above-introduced  transformation,  Maesschalk  and  Van  de  Walle  
note  that  federalization  in  Belgium  was  an  energy-intensive  process  for  the  political  
elites  of  the  two  segments,  due  to  which  the  chances  for  important  reforms  were  
hindered,  which  contributed  to  the  unfolding  of  political  dysfunctions.  Perhaps  more  
importantly,  they  point  to  the  paradoxical  result  of  the  federalizing  State  Reforms:  this  
“low  incidence  of  shared  policy  competencies  in  the  Belgian  federation  further  increases  
the  scope  for  policy  divergence  and  experimentation.”  In  such  a  context,  “more  regional  
autonomy  is  seen  as  the  best  solution  to  policy  failure,”  while  perhaps  more  advantageous  
and  rather  cost-efficient  practices  tend  to  be  ignored.146 
Before  turning  to  the  introduction  of  the  actual  elites  involved  in  the  federalization  
process,  we  would  like  to  take  a  moment  to  overview  the  arch  drawn  by  the  series  of  
State  Reforms  in  the  last  roughly  fifty  years.  Based  on  the  chapter  above,  the  two  
originally  identified  phases  of  State  Reforms  can  be  subdivided  in  the  following  way:  
while  the  first  two  called  the  subnational  units  into  being,  the  subsequent  agreements  
concerned  the  delegation  of  power  and  competences  towards  the  subnational  level.  That  
is,  whilst  the  third  and  fourth  Reforms  expanded  their  initial  competences,  the  fifth  one  
enlarged  their  financial  latitude.  All  the  above  given,  the  sixth  State  Reform  –  as  the  
latest  actual  development  hitherto  –  finally  disrupted  the  social  security,  formerly  held  
to  be  the  untouchable  ‘glue’  of  the  more  or  less  existing  unity  in  Belgium.  For  those  
worried  about  this  questionably  functioning  unity  it  might  be  a  warning  sign  that  the  
                                                             
143 Simultaneously, the courts in Brussels were divided to separate French- and Dutch-speaking bars. (Goossens 
& Cannoot, 2015, 35) 
144 Goossens & Cannoot, 2015, 44; Béland, 2018 
145 Goossens & Cannoot, 2015, 49 




Flemish  Interest147  set  the  “diving  board”  of  Flemish  separatism  and  independence  in  
the  division  of  this  field  into  a  separate  Flemish  and  Walloon  one  in  the  beginning  of  
the  third  millenium.148  Yet,  the  case  of  an  independent  Flanders  has  since  been  on  the  
agenda  of  a  more  moderate  force  on  the  political  right,  the  New  Flemish  Alliance149  –  
as  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter.   
 
                                                             
147 The Vlaams Blok reorganized itself in 2004, and changed its name to Vlaams Belang. In the next chapter, we 
will outline these developments in more detail.  
148 Mudde, 2000, 105 




III. The  ‘conductor’  of  the  Belgian  federalisation:  The  party  
system  in  Belgium 
Parties  were  established  in  the  coming  decades  after  the  declaration  of  Belgian  
independence  in  1830.150  One  feature  of  this  period  was  the  lack  of  sharp  confrontations  
among  different  parties,  neither  were  there  any  clashes  between  the  aristocracy  and  the  
Church.  Another  was  the  participation  of  conservative  forces  in  the  independence  
movement.151  Due  to  the  determinant  role  of  parties  –  namely,  a  specific  system  of  
clientele152  was  developed  between  the  parties  and  the  citizens,  the  former  being  the  
representatives  of  the  “territorial  identities”153  –  the  Belgian  political  system  is  often  
referred  to  as  a  “partitocracy”.154   
The  gradual  extension  of  the  right  to  vote  in  1893155,  in  1919  and  finally,  in  
1948156  largely  contributed  for  the  wider  involvement  of  the  society  in  the  political  
decision-  and  opinion-making.  As  a  result  of  the  voters’  adherence,  new  parties  have  
had  a  hard  time  in  their  breakthrough.157  It  is  fundamental  and  unique  of  the  Belgian  
party  system  –  and  is  also  a  factor  in  the  political  culture  –  that  it  is  bipolar158  (or  
binary):  since  1970s,  there  have  not  been  a  nation-wide  or  national,  so-called  Belgian,  
party.  It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  the  Labour  Party  (Parti  du  travail  de  
Belgique  and  Partij  van  de  Arbeid  van  België  in  French  and  in  Dutch)  in  Belgium  
functions  as  a  bilungual  faction  which  refers  to  itself  as  national.159  The  flexibility  and  
the  (cap)ability  to  adapt  to  changes  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  parties  in  general  could  
keep  their  voters  following  their  division  along  the  ethnic-linguistic  cleavages  in  the  
1970s.160  In  addition,  as  was  premised  in  an  earlier  chapter,  coalitions  characterize  
government  formation,  as  none  of  the  parties  gained  a  sufficient  majority.161  Indeed,  
                                                             
150 The liberals gathered into a political party in 1846, the Catholics did so in 1884, while one year later, the 
evolution of the industrial society brought with it the establishment of the Socialist party. (Csizmadia, 2004, 68) 
151 The constitutional monarchy gaining independence at the time, included both conservative and liberal elements. 
(Erdődy, 2010, 7-8) 
152 Johancsik, 1994, 54-57 
153 Keszthelyi, 2009, 92 
154 Although Lieven de Winter already used the expression in an article of his published in 2000. (Csizmadia, 2004, 
72; De Winter, 2000)   
155 According to this development – which was due to the agreement between the workers and the Catholics –, 
every Belgian citizen above the age of 25 years was entitled to vote, while each constituent’s votes were maximised 
in three. The introduction of compulsory voting was brought about also by the 1893 reform of the electoral system. 
(Johancsik, 1994, 55; Maurice Vauthier, 1894, 726) 
156 Kossmann-Putto & Kossmann, 1998, 51 
157 Johancsik, 1994, 57 
158 Swenden, 2002, 76 
159  Barsi, 2001, 190; Ignáth, 2002, 176; Marxistleninist.wordpress.com, 2010 
160 The Communist Party of Belgium is an exception to it, having lost most of its supporters by the 1958 elections. 
(Karsai, 1986, 170 




except  for  the  Socialist  administration,  incumbent  for  a  week,  in  March  1946,  and  the  
exclusively  Christian-Democratic  government  between  1950  and  1954,  Belgium  was  
always  led  by  multi-party  coalitions,  in  the  post-war  period.162  However,  shadow  cabinets  
–  namely,  the  opposition  forces  which  could  put  pressure  on  the  government  parties,  
and  be  potent  to  take  over  –  have  been  absent.163   
Considering  the  political  developments  of,  and  how  the  Belgian  party  system  
unfolded  in  the  last  century,  the  parties  in  Belgium  might  be  classified  into  three  distinct  
groups  as  follows:  (1)  traditional  parties  established  on  certain  ideological  waves;  liberal  
and  Christian  (Catholic,  predominantly),  and  –  in  the  wake  of  the  Walloon  labour  
movement  –  the  Socialist  Party;  (2)  the  so-called  regionalist  parties,  which  formerly  
functioned  simultaneously,  and  subsequently,  separate  from  the  beginning  of  their  
existence;  and  (3)  the  ecological  (or,  green)  parties  which  set  up  approximately  three  
decades  ago  –  also,  separately  organized  by  the  Flemish  and  the  Walloon  side  of  the  
language  boundary.  The  subchapter  below,  without  regard  to  a  detailed  introduction,  
turns  to  the  first  two  groups,  in  an  attempt  to  make  sense  of  the  line  which  the  
federalism  drew  in  the  Belgian  political  culture,  and  which  can  be  noticed  in  the  
different  movements  of  traditional  and  denominational,  and  the  cultural-linguistic  division.  
The  case  of  the  latter  mentioned  parties  carries  notable  importance,  their  rhetoric  reflects  
a  dichotomous  idea  of  “a  territorial  community  (‘us’)  versus  a  dominant  center  
(‘them’),”164  a  concept  which  does  not  stand  far  from  the  populist  interpretation  of  
political  reality. 
 
III.1.  The  evolution  of  a  bipolar  political  culture:  The  divergence  of  
traditional  parties  and  the  rise  of  regionalist  movements  in  Belgium 
As  regards  Belgian  parties,  the  Liberals  were  the  first  to  be  founded  as  a  party,  and  as  
such,  they  held  power  between  1846  and  1884.  Later,  following  the  First  World  War,  
the  Liberal  Party  cooperated  with  the  Belgian  Labour  Party  which  simultaneously  
appeared  with  some  new  formations,  promoting  predominantly  extremist  views.  The  aims  
and  agenda  of  the  Liberals  were  subsequently  represented  –  henceforward,  in  ‘ethnic  
colours’  –  by  the  Flemish  Partij  voor  Vrijheid  en  Vooruitgang  (Party  for  Freedom  and  
Progress)  and  the  Walloon  Parti  Réformateur  Libéral  (Liberal  Reformist  Party)  –  Flemish  
and  Walloon  counterparts  on  the  same  ideological  wave  –,  while  the  Socialist  Party  
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163 Johancsik, 1994, 56 




following  its  dissolution  in  1978,  was  reorganised  as  the  Flemish  Socialistische  Partij  
and  the  Walloon  Parti  Socialiste.165  Within  the  Christian-Socialist  or  Christian-Democratic  
Party  began  to  ferment  quite  early,  in  1936,  according  to  which  the  Flemish  and  the  
Walloon  branch  started  to  distance  themselves  from  each  other.  The  gap  deepened  in  
the  1960s  while  finally  the  events  in  1968  turned  out  to  be  the  final  straw:  then,  
following  years  of  tension  and  hostility  between  the  two  communities,  the  French-
speaking  sections  of  the  Catholic  University  of  Leuven-Louvain  were  eventually  
separated.166  The  factions  –  as  first  among  Belgian  parties  –  called  two  parties  into  
being:  the  Parti  Social  Chrétien  (Christian  Social  Party),  along  with  the  Christelijke  
Volkspartij  (Christian  People’s  Party).167  The  recently  organised  Flemish  Christian-
Democratic  Party  announced  the  programme  of  “unionist  federalism”168  and,  at  the  same  
time,  objected  to  Brussels’  emerging  as  an  independent  region  –  the  latter  in  the  course  
of  the  constitutional  state  reforms  in  the  1980s.  The  Walloon  Christian-Socialists  –  
reluctantly,  though  –  supported  these  issues,  and  they  furthermore  advocated  the  
unification  of  the  Walloon  Region.169   
Finally,  the  articulation  of  the  bipolar  Belgian  politics  was  complemented  by  the  
movements  building  on  certain  linguistic  and  cultural  ends.  The  Volksunie  (People’s  
Union;  henceforward:  VU)  –  founded  in  1954  –  guarded  the  Flemish  language  itself,  
and  promoted  the  federalization  of  the  country  into  two  linguistic  communities  as  its  
political  objective,170  thus  it  can  be  concluded  that  the  movement  was  fuelled  by  the  
oppression  that  had  been  experienced  by  the  Flemish  population  in  terms  of  language  
usage,  and  that  it  was  a  fundamental  element  of  their  spirit  to  view  Brussels  as  an  
integral  part  of  Flanders.171  At  the  turn  of  the  1970s  and  1980s,  two  additional  Fleming  
parties  appeared,  both  grounding  its  rhetoric  on  the  Flemish  national  consciousness:  the  
Vlaams  Nationale  Partij  (Flemish  Nationalist  Party)  –  formerly  a  constituent  element  of  
                                                             
165 Ignáth, 2002, 179 
166 The development was of symbolic importance – that is, the Flemish students and citizens of the city never could 
come to terms with the of a sizeable French-speaking bloc living in Flanders, not far from Brussels. In their eyes, 
the Walloon elements of the University “played the role of the Trojan horse.” (Goossens, 2009, 191)  
167 The process of distancing developed into the final dissolution at an extraordinary congress in the following 
year. After that, the two parties kept the structures of coordination and the position of the president; nevertheless, 
the two parties elected two separate party leaders in 1972 – namely, Charles Ferdinand Nothomb and Wilfried 
Martens. (Csizmadia, 2004, 73-75; Deschouwer, 2012, 81) 
168 Ignáth, 2002, 177 
169 Ibid 
170 Deschouwer, 2009, 565 
171 The linguistic and cultural “denomination” of Brussels has proved to be a sensitive matter over time due to its 
paradoxical status: although it is situated in Flanders, it is fundamentally French-speaking. One of the principles 
of the State Reforms, the minority protection, is aiming at providing protection for the Flemish citizens in the 




the  Volksunie  –,  and  the  Vlaamse  Volkspartij  (Flemish  People’s  Party).  The  two  groups  
allied  with  the  elections  of  1978  in  sight:  they  thereby  campaigned  under  the  name  
Vlaams  Blok  (Flemish  Block)172,  and  at  the  first  place  on  their  agenda  was  the  
independent  Flemish  state  with  Brussels  as  capital,  thus  they  openly  represented  
fundamentally  separatist  sentiments.173  During  the  1980s,  their  causes  were  not  represented  
by  any  other  (Flemish)  movement;  these  were  –  as  Erk  enumerates  them  –,  
“anticommunism,  anti-abortion,  pro-apartheid  and  pro-amnesty  for  the  Nazi  
collaborators.”174  Following  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  besides  the  above-mentioned  –  
and  especially,  being  against  the  idea  of  a  federation  shared  by  the  Walloon  population  
–,  the  Block  became  infamous  for  its  anti-immigration  stances.  In  the  subsequent  two  
decades  –  from  1991  to  2010  –,  the  party’s  radicalism  was  considerably  growing,  
perhaps  due  to  the  Islamist  attacks  in  the  early  2000s  in  both  Europe  and  the  United  
States.175  Interestingly,  this  period  coincided  with  their  most  significant  electoral  success,  
that  is,  from  the  1990s  until  the  early  years  of  the  new  millennium.176  Its  radicalism  
was  deepening  despite  the  so-called  cordon  sanitaire  which  came  into  effect  in  1992:  
accordingly,  they  were  excluded  from  political  alliances  by  all  parties  in  the  Parliament.177  
Akkerman  and  Rooduijn  referred  to  the  inclusion-moderation  concept  in  their  2015  
article.  For  its  purpose,  those  originally  radical  parties  who  are  involved  in  the  democratic  
procedures,  will  be  incited  to  soften  their  radicalism.178  Nevertheless,  as  has  been  already  
mentioned,  it  was  not  to  happen  to  the  Interest.  Instead,  being  excluded,  it  kept  moving  
towards  the  right  end  of  the  spectrum.  In  November  2004,  the  Court  of  Cassation  in  
Belgium  concluded  the  “Vlaams  Blok  to  be  in  breach  of  the  law  against  racism”179;  to  
be  more  exact,  three  associations  in  the  halo  of  the  party  were  convicted  for  violating  
a  legislation  against  racist  and  xenophobic  behaviour,  generally  known  in  Belgium  as  
the  Mouraux  law  of  1981.  According  to  the  Court’s  decision,  the  party  had  to  dissolve  
itself,  and  make  sure  that  if  it  ever  chose  re-establishment,  it  must  be  done  in  harmony  
                                                             
172 Subsequently, two wings were articulated within the Volksunie: the traditional nationalist New Flemish Alliance 
(Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie), and the more left-wing Spirit. (Adam & Deschouwer, 2016, 1290-1291) 
173 It is typical, that as the ethnic-linguistic controversies came to an end, thousands of its earlier voters turned 
away. Furthermore – given the party’s more accommodating tone –, the young Flemish voters tended to support 
smaller and more radical parties, further from those of the establishment. Another tendency is that since the 1970s-
1980s, the young voters inclined to choose extreme left-wing or the newly organised ecological parties at the 
ballots. (Karsai, 1986, 177-180) 
174 Erk, 2005, 496 
175 Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015, 1149-1151 
176 de Cleen, 2013, 209 
177 Erk, 2005, 496 
178 However, their hypothesis was not approved in the end – due partly to the Belang’s case. (Akkerman & 
Rooduijn, 2015, 1140; 1148-1150) 




with  the  federal  legislation.  Hence,  the  re-branded  Vlaams  Belang  (Flemish  Interest)  was  
promptly  called  into  being.  Certain  experts  –  Erk,  among  others  –  suppose  that  this  
turn  was  more  than  a  mere  change  of  name;  rather,  it  has  been  seen  as  a  deep  and  
deliberate  revision  of  the  brand.  One  element  of  it  was  their  economic  policies  leaning  
towards  neoliberalism,  including  the  fact  that  the  xenophobic  strand  in  their  rhetoric  has  
lessened.180  Since  its  reorganization,  it  has  functioned  as  a  seemingly  proper  and  
democratic  actor  –  however,  not  much  of  its  foundations  has  ever  changed,  according  
to  others.  In  de  Been’s  conclusion:  “[w]hile  the  VB  presents  itself  as  a  democratic  
party,  it  attempts  to  enforce  what  it  considers  unquestionable  nationalist,  conservative  
and  populist  demands.”181  The  VU  was  closed  down  at  the  dawn  of  the  third  millennium,  
opening  the  way  before  the  Blok’s  rival  on  the  right.  The  Nieuw-Vlaamse  Alliantie  (New  
Flemish  Alliance;  henceforward:  N-VA)  viewed  to  be  the  VU’s  successor  party  decided  
to  join  hands  with  the  Christian-Democrats,  who  hence  returned  as  a  governing  party  
in  the  Flemish  government.  The  Alliance  initially  articulated  the  confederal  model  to  be  
its  political  goal.182  The  N-VA  continues  to  engage  voters  with  the  promise  of  the  
subsequent  federalisation  of  Belgium,  and  is  widely  held  to  be  a  secessionist  
movement.183  For  the  first  time,  the  N-VA  became  the  most  popular  party  not  only  in  
Flanders,  but  also  nation-wide  in  2010.  Nowadays,  it  is  led  by  the  recognised  and  
popular  politician,  Bart  De  Wever.184     
Out  of  a  worry  due  to  the  expected  success  of  the  Flemish  movement  –  more  
precisely,  mobilized  by  the  resentment  felt  upon  the  language  laws  of  1962  and  1963185  
–,  the  ideologically  plural  Front  Démocratique  Francophone  (henceforward:  FDF)  was  
set  up.  The  Front  was  acting  absolutely  against  the  above-mentioned  ideas:  the  concept  
of  the  capital  belonging  to  Flanders  met  their  complete  rejection,  regarding  the  fact  that  
the  majority  of  Brussels’  habitants  were  French-speakers.  Recently,  the  FDF’s  influence  
has  been  restrained  to  the  local  level;  as  such,  it  has  not  pursued  a  programme  
                                                             
180 Erk, 2005, 493-495 
181 de Been, 2012, 217 
182 Beyens et al., 2013, 1112 
183 As written on the party’s website: the politicians of the N-VA see confederalism as a fertile ground for “real 
democracy” and “good governance.” (Source: the website of the N-VA, available: N-va.be.) 
184 As Belgium is approaching the federal, subnational and supranational (i.e. European Parliament) elections in 
May this year, Bart De Wever announced in January, that he would be ready to leave his office as Mayor of 
Antwerp, and to serve as the minister-president of Flanders, provided that his party performs well in May. 
(Bradshaw, 2019) 
185 There were two phenomena which affected the French-speaking community negatively: first, they found the 
fixation of the language border unacceptable, and second, the requirement that the public servants in Brussels had 
to be bilingual (as empiria had made it clear, that the Dutch-speakers were more likely to satisfy this criterion). 




exclusively  focusing  on  language  protection.186  Finally,  another  French-speaking  faction  
is  worth  being  mentioned  hereby:  the  Belgian  Front  National  –  following  the  example  
of  its  French  counterpart  –  initially  opposed  to  federalizing  the  country,  however,  after  
the  fourth  State  Reform,  took  a  different  stance  thus  becoming  the  promoter  of  the  
provincial  federalism.187  Since  2016,  the  party  has  functioned  under  the  name,  DéFI,  
which  carries  the  principles  and  values  of  the  party,  which  are:  democrat,  federalist  and  
independent.  (It  is  also  a  play  on  words,  as  défi  means  challenge  in  French.)188 
 Evaluating  the  results  of  the  regionalist  parties’  performance  prior  to  the  division  
of  the  party  system  into  two,  one  can  immediately  see  that  their  popularity  peaked  at  
the  general  elections  of  1971.189  Nevertheless,  their  importance  quickly  faded.  For  
instance,  Adam  and  Deschouwer  attempted  to  explain  the  insignificance  of  the  VU:  in  
their  point  of  view,  it  is  exactly  the  language  conflict  which  caused  a  drop  in  the  
number  of  its  supporters.  (Namely,  their  votes  were  subsequently  given  rather  to  the  
linguistically-separate  traditional  parties.)190  Within  the  meaning  of  the  fourth  State  
Reform  in  1993,  Belgium  developed  into  a  federal  state  –  simultaneously,  as  the  
subnational  entities  were  provided  with  competences  and  proper  political  institutions,  the  
success  of  the  regionalist  movements  began  to  gain  less  significant  success  at  subsequent  
polls;  to  the  extent  that  some  of  them  have  disappeared  completely.191  However,  De  
Wever’s  N-VA  –  as  the  present  generation  of  nationalist  parties  –,  has  convinced  a  
number  of  Flemish  voters:  that  is  how  it  became  the  most  attractive  party  in  the  2010s.  
And  that  is  even  to  say,  that  according  to  the  latest  opinion  polls  (carried  out  on  11th  
February  2019),  the  N-VA  is  likely  to  gain  the  most  seats  in  the  Federal  Parliament  in  
May  2019.192 
Based  on  the  chapter  above,  one  could  conclude  that  the  regionalist  movement  
was  organized  following  certain  cultural-linguistic  objectives  and  concepts,  while  that  of  
                                                             
186 The FDF was a member of Brussels’ government between 1989 and 2004 – from 1993-on, in a coalition with 
the French-speaking Liberal Party. (Ibid) 
187 Delwit, 2007, 146 
188 Keszthelyi, 2009, 99-100; Cokelaere & van Dorpe, 2018 
189 In this year, the Volksunie ended up with 19% of the Flemish votes; the Rassemblement Wallon gathered 21% 
of the Walloon votes, and the FDF 28% in Brussels. (Deschouwer, 2009, 564) 
190 Adam & Deschouwer, 2016, 1293 
191 Ibid 559 
192 As a matter of fact, the results of latest federal elections in 2014 evidenced considerable divisions between 
Flanders and Wallonia: “[t]he centrifugal dynamic further reinforced existing social differences between the north 
and the south,” conclude André and Depauw. (André & Depauw, 2015, 228)  
As noted earlier, since the thesis is restricted to the developments until April 2019, we will not discuss the results 
of the regional, federal and European-level elections in Belgium. For these results, see the database of official 
results compiled by the Federal Public Services Home Affairs (available online: 




the  Walloon  community  was  basically  a  response  to  the  former.193  These  incentives  and  
reactions  have  expressed  themselves  in  politics,  as  well:  the  cleavage  has  fundamentally  
run  along  the  centre-periphery  split,  since  the  regionalist  movements  of  both  communities  
were  mobilized  against  the  centre  behind  which  the  Flemish  and  the  Walloon  equally  
feared  the  dominance  of  ‘the  other’.194  The  division  of  the  party  system  presents  itself  
on  a  North-South  scale:  it  is  only  in  Flanders  where  radical  right-wing  party  –  the  
Flemish  Interest  –  once  enjoying  a  relatively  broad  electoral  support,  visualises  the  
establishment  of  an  independent  Flanders;  its  French-speaking  counterpart  does  not  exist.  
It  is  also  observable,  that  the  parties  of  the  French-speaking  side  have  less  influence,  
regarding  the  small  number  of  Walloons  –  relatively  to  that  of  the  Flemish  –  who  
choose  to  turn  to  ethnic  organisations.195  Experience  shows,  that  it  was  initially  the  VB  
to  oppose  the  idea  of  the  unitary  state  and  added  the  idea  of  regional  division  on  their  
political  agenda  –  since,  however,  the  more  moderate  nationalist  N-VA  has  also  
prioritized  the  idea  of  an  independent  Flanders.196  Maesschalck  and  Van  de  Walle  point  
to  an  interesting  phenomenon  with  regard  to  the  VB’s  participation  in  the  political  
competition  (which  is  to  be  reduced  to  Flanders,  according  to  the  above-introduced  
process):  their  suggestion  is  that  the  cordon  sanitaire  “effectively  reduced  the  levels  of  
political  competition  by  forcing  all  the  other  political  parties  (except  for  the  Greens)  
into  a  grand  coalition  government.”197  Considering  the  2004  turn  of  the  Blok/Belang  
which  in  fact  brought  some  ease  to  the  political  atmosphere,  it  might  be  understandable  
for  the  Flemish  parties  re-evaluate  the  collective  isolation  of  the  ‘reborn’  party.198   
 
 
                                                             
193 As has been mentioned earlier, the real goal of the Flemish was the attainment of the cultural autonomy – which 
was far from being surprising owing to their experience of oppression in the shadow of the French language –, 
whereas the Walloon population was fighting for economic autonomy – although not yet succeeding in reaching 
it; they were in fact, in favour of federalization. 
194 Kris Deschouwer interprets the struggle of regionalist parties as a “classical center-periphery”-cleavage.  
(Deschouwer, 2009, 559-561) The author characterizes the Belgian state in terms of which one could not talk about 
center as such – instead, it is rather about two peripheries, both of which suppose that the other is more dominant. 
(Deschouwer, 2012, 249) 
195 Csizmadia, 2004, 126 
196 Adam & Deschouwer, 2016, 1300  
197 Maesschalck & Van de Walle, 2006, 1014 
Nonetheless, it is important to note, that their observations were published in 2006, thus the degree of political 
competition or fragmentation in Flanders remains to be researched. 
198 Erk, 2005, 499 
Akkerman and Rooduijn’s analysis resulted in some fascinating and relevant observations; one of them concerns 
the phenomenon that those parties are likely to be surrounded by the cordon, which are perceived as extremist, 
and not necessarily the actually most radical movements: “Cordon sanitaires apparently are not so much directed 
at the most radical parties, but rather at those parties that are radical and have a reputation of extremism.” 










The  general  wave  of  populist  tendencies  –  fed  by  hostility  towards  immigrants  –  have  
not  left  Western  Europe  intact,  for  which  phenomenon  the  Netherlands  stands  as  an  
excellent  example.  The  contemporary  Dutch  populism  has  its  evolution,  and  its  recent  
developments  fit  in  a  general  tendency  of  democratic  recession  and  from  this  point  of  
view,  are  at  least  worrying.  On  15th  of  March  2017,  national  elections  took  place  in  
the  Netherlands  –  earlier,  the  Dutch  society  lived  through  an  intriguing  campaign  period.  
The  clash  of  the  parties  of  political  establishment  and  the  radical  and  anti-establishment  
right-wing  Freedom  Party  (in  Dutch:  Partij  voor  de  Vrijheid;  henceforward:  PVV)  led  
by  the  anti-immigrant  and  especially,  anti-Islam  populist  politician,  Geert  Wilders  was  
expected  to  be  an  interesting  aspect  of  the  2017  elections.199  Nevertheless,  Wilder’s  
party  fell  below  the  predictions  of  many  analysts200;  at  the  end  of  the  day,  his  party  
turned  out  to  be  the  second  largest  party  in  the  Binnenhof  with  20  seats,  after  the  33  
seats  of  Prime  Minister  Mark  Rutte’s  People's  Party  for  Freedom  and  Democracy  (in  
Dutch:  Volkspartij  voor  Vrijheid  en  Democratie;  henceforward:  VVD).201  An  historic  
development  was  the  electoral  success  of  the  Denk  (the  word  itself  has  meanings  in  
two  languages:  in  Dutch,  it  means  “Think”;  in  Turkish,  “Equal”):  with  3  seats  in  the  
House  of  Representatives,  this  formation  is  the  first  representative  of  immigrants  in  the  
Netherlands.202  Interestingly,  the  political  left  found  itself  in  a  disappointing  position:  
albeit  the  second  most  powerful  force  with  38  seats  in  2012  (after  the  VVD),  it  has  
virtually  disappeared  from  the  lower  house  of  the  legislation  with  not  more  than  9  seats  
at  the  latest  polls.203   
                                                             
199 Mudde, 2017 
200 The main target of the party leader was initially the presence of numerous Dutch immigrants – yet since, he has 
become a vehement critic of the European Union, as well. Thus, prior to the elections in 2017, he began to attract 
supporters in two dimensions. Wilder’s promises – concludes a survey carried out in the summer of 2016 – gained 
considerable electoral support. According to its results, the PVV would have gained 35 seats, while the VVD 
would have gained not more than 24, had the elections been held in July 2015. (Kroet, 2016)  
201 For the results, see: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/03/16/dutch-election-results. 
202 The Dutch-Surinamese Sylvana Simons – formerly a member of Denk – left the party in 2016, to found another 
immigrant party with the priorities of the representation of the LBGT-community and the fight against women’s 
oppression. Her party was originally competing under the name Artikel 1 (in English: Article 1), it was replaced 
later with BIJ1(Otjes & Krouwel, 2018, 7; Dutchnews.nl, 2018) 




 Although  populists,  are  not  the  members  of  the  government,  the  altogether  
significant  support  for  right-wing  populism  in  the  Netherlands,  is,  however,  worth  the  
attention.  Recently,  populist  politics  took  a  turn  with  a  new  personality  having  stepped  
on  the  scene:  Thierry  Baudet  made  his  breakthrough  at  the  provincial  elections  as  the  
head  of  his  freshly  established  party,  the  Forum  for  Democracy  (in  Dutch:  Forum  voor  
Democratie;  henceforward:  FvD).204  Many  of  the  PVV’s  voters  have  drifted  towards  the  
new  Eurosceptic  initiative,  which  openly  would  like  to  see  a  “Nexit”  on  the  Dutch  
political  agenda.205 
Until  the  ides  of  the  1950s,  the  segments  –  or  as  we  will  refer  to  them  
subsequently:  the  pillars  –  served  as  a  solution  to  the  tense  issues  caused  by  pluralism.  
During  the  decades  of  the  “accommodation”,  the  Dutch  citizens,  who  lived  their  lives  
in  the  complex  institutional  network  in  this  period,  turned  to  their  own  elites  with  
considerable  trust.  However,  the  Netherlands,  a  depillarised  society  today,  cannot  with  
good  chance  avoid  deciding  on  the  immigrant  masses  coming  in  high  numbers  from  
Morocco  and  Turkey.  With  the  establishment  of  two  parties  which  build  on  migrants  as  
members,  and  which  aim  to  defend  the  interest  of  immigrant  communities,  the  
Netherlands  might  be  witnessing  the  rise  of  a  new  religious  and  ethnic-cultural  pillar.206  
The  desired  settlement  touches  upon  the  role  of  the  state,  potentially  setting  it  a  new  
challenge.  The  second  case  study  of  the  thesis  opens  by  enumerating  the  processes  of  
pillarisation  and  depillarisation.  Later,  the  features  of  the  Dutch  party  system207  and  the  
relevant  aspects  of  the  political  culture  in  the  Netherlands  will  be  observed  –  all  this  
with  particular  regard  to  the  peaceful  –  and  successful  –  realization  of  consociationalism,  
as  long  as  the  cohabitation  of  the  segments  needed  an  institutionalized  reconciliation.  
The  closing  chapter  will  weigh,  as  far  as  possible,  the  typical  period  of  Dutch  
consociationalism  between  1917  and  1955,  besides  looking  at  the  present  and  future  
relevance  of  the  consociationalist  settlement.  All  the  above  in  the  case  of  the  Netherlands  
                                                             
204 As noted earlier, since the thesis is restricted to the developments until April 2019, we will not discuss the 
results of the European-level elections in the Netherlands. For the results, see the database of the European 
Parliament and Kantar (available online: https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/national-
results/netherlands/2019-2024/).   
205 The party was established in 2016. (Schaart, 2019)  
As for Geert Wilders, he did not admit to have failed at the elections: he saw the performance of his party as a step 
in a long process. As the elections for the European Parliament were approaching (the EP-elections took place 
from 23rd to 26th of May), Wilders continued to commit himself to expressing his anti-European Union and anti-
immigrant views on the European level as well, ready to make an alliance with Orbán Viktor and Matteo Salvini. 
(Graham, 2017; Hvg.hu, 2018) 
206 As has been investigated earlier – among others – by Schrover and Andeweg & Irwin. (Schrover, 2010; 
Andeweg & Irwin, 2009) 
207 Similarly to the party system-related segments in the firsrt case study, we restrict ourselves to the exclusive 




generally  known  for  its  tolerance,  adaptability  and  a  traditional  liberal  atmosphere,  which  
in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  became  the  stronghold  of  political  correctness  –  
and  also,  that  of  fields  left  untouched  as  taboos.208 
 
 
IV.  Pillars  and  multi-party  system:  The  features  of  the  Dutch  political  
culture 
Regarding  the  significant  role  of  political  elites  in  consociational  democracies  –  since  
the  state’s  unity  is  the  result  of  the  cooperation  and  consensus  –,  an  analysis  of  the  
Netherlands’  party  system  through  its  evolution  in  the  20th  century  seems  unavoidable.  
Such  an  attempt  is  even  more  justified  if  we  hold  the  following  to  be  true,  to  which  
László  Flamm,  the  Hungarian  expert  of  foreign  policy  referred:  the  party  system  is  the  
mirror  of  the  evolution  of  Dutch  history,  which,  at  the  same  time,  makes  the  inherent  
conflicts  of  the  society  divided209  along  confession  or  ideology,  on  the  one  hand,  and  
social  class,  on  the  other  –  discernible.210     
 It  is  known,  that  in  1914  the  Dutch  elites  had  to  test  their  willingness  and  
capacity  to  cooperate:  the  debate  on  the  broadening  of  the  suffrage  and  on  the  status  
of  religious  schools  had  to  be  brought  to  an  end  at  one  point.211  Thus,  the  broadly  
supported  ‘Pacification’  leads  the  investigation  towards  to  processes  undoubtedly  relevant  
when  it  comes  to  the  social  and  political  organization  of  the  Netherlands.  The  following  
chapters  of  the  thesis,  will,  first  of  all,  concern  the  processes  of  the  pillarisation  and  
depillarisation,  shedding  light  on  how  these  relate  to  consociationalism  in  the  chapter’s  
conclusion.  Here,  we  will  also  raise  the  possibility  of  a  –  hypothetical  or  actual  –  new  
era  of  pillarisation. 
 
IV.1.  Pillarisation 
Between  1917  and  1950,  the  Netherlands’  subcultures  were  organized  vertically  into  
pillars:  in  fact,  each  zuil  displayed  a  certain  subsegment.  These  elements  build  up  the  
                                                             
208 The Dutch sociologist, Herman Vuijsje in his book The Politically Correct Netherlands: Since the 1960s 
(original title: Correct, weldenkend Nederland sinds de jaren zestig) gives an exhaustive account on why certain 
topics were lift out from public discussion, besides enumerating its downsides. 
This phenomenon survived right until the 1990s, when a Liberal politician Frits Bolkestein and the left-wing writer, 
Paul Scheffer. (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 45-46)  
209 Lijphart, 1975, 16   
A significant consequence of loyalty, which can be linked to the cleavages discussed earlier, is that they have the 
ability of reducing political extremes – for this more in detail, see the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
210 Flamm, 2004, 303   




so-called  system  of  pillarisation  (Verzuiling),  according  to  which  the  Dutch  parties  were  
established  on  the  forefront,  on  the  one  hand,  of  the  two  confessional  –  namely,  a  
Protestant  and  a  Catholic  –,  and  on  the  other  hand,  of  non-confessional,  or  in  other  
words,  secular-ideological  segments.  As  a  consequence  of  their  closedness212,  these  are  
almost  completely  homogeneous,  yet  their  entirety  moves  in  the  direction  of  the  society’s  
heterogeneity,  since  the  divisions  affect  not  only  the  political,  but  also  every  other  aspect  
of  life.213   
 The  pillarisation,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  fixed  the  (three-fold)  division  of  the  society  
as  an  historic  tradition  in  terms  of  political  practice:  certain  theories  date  this  concept  
back  to  the  establishment  of  the  Dutch  state  in  the  16th  century.  In  this  regard,  the  
importance  of  the  independence214  which  the  Dutch  gained  from  Philipe  II,  the  king  of  
Catholic  Spain,  seems  somehow  significant:  in  this  emancipatory  war,  the  seeds  of  the  
subsequent  discord  between  the  Catholic  and  the  Protestant  community  were  sown.  An  
additional  consequence  of  this  period  was  the  fragmentation  of  the  Protestant  Church,  
to  several  distinct  wings:  it  means,  that  –  among  others  –  an  orthodox  group  of  
Calvinists  rigidly  practicing  their  faith  appeared  beside  the  central  Reformed  Church.215   
In  addition  to  the  religious  division,  the  class-cleavage  was  another  line  running  
across  the  society:  its  roots  were  deep  rooted  similarly  to  those  of  the  Catholic-Protestant  
duality.  The  Dutch  middle-class  appeared  uniquely  early,  by  European  standards:  the  
bourgeoisie  had  owned  a  considerable  position  since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic.216  
Lijphart  observing  the  indicators  and  data  of  the  20th  century  concluded  that  although  
the  economic  inequality  by  large  moderated,  the  inequalities  in  income  remained  
noticeable  in  the  1950s.  Alongside  the  economic  hard  data,  it  might  be  a  viable  step  
to  measure  also  the  members’  loyalty  towards  their  own  class.  Unfortunately,  it  is  made  
more  difficult  by  the  fact  that  certain  topics  were  banished  from  public  discourses  –  
and  perhaps  more  regrettably,  from  the  discussions  of  social  sciences,  too.  After  all,  
Lijphart  tried  to  support  his  statement,  and  evoked  the  results  of  a  UNESCO  survey  
from  1948,  from  which  he  drew  the  following  conclusions:  firstly,  Dutch  citizens  were  
aware  of  their  own  social  status,  and  secondly,  they  were  able  to  make  correct  estimations  
                                                             
212 In their 2009 book, Andeweg and Irwin evoke the fictional examples of how ordinary Catholics and Protestants 
would have probably lived their whole lives in the complex institutional net of their own pillar. According to their 
introduction, denomination or ideological affiliation would determine the schools of their children, just like the 
hospitals, they chose to go, or the trade union they were members of. (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 28-30) Schrover 
described this affiliation as a “cradle-to-grave embededdness.” (Schrover, 2010, 332) 
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concerning  their  fellow  citizens’  positions,  and  classify  them  into  –  working,  middle-  or  
upper-  –  classes.217   
 In  the  next  sections,  the  pillars  will  be  introduced  individually  –  these  units  will  
be  the  organizing  elements  of  the  case  study,  just  as  they  are  of  the  Dutch  society  and  
politics,  in  accordance  with  the  Verzuiling  concept.  Having  them  reviewed,  the  following  
subchapters  will  build  the  party  system  on  such  foundations.   
  
                                                             






IV.1.1.  The  Catholic  pillar  and  the  Protestant  pillar(s) 
Although  Lijphart  himself  considers  a  three-fold  division  –  whilst  others,  such  as  the  
Hungarian  Enyedi,  have  a  different  interpretation218  –  concerning  the  pillar  system,  it  is  
here  not  three  (or  four)  subchapters  to  deal  with  the  social  and  political  base  units.  
That  is  to  say,  in  this  case,  it  is  more  practical  to  discuss  these  in  one  segment. 
 As  mentioned  previously,  the  memory  of  the  war  of  independence  has  had  great  
importance  and  a  lasting  effect.  Namely,  in  the  period  of  the  establishment  of  the  
Republic  of  the  Seven  Provinces  –  around  1600  –,  Catholics  experienced  an  oppression  
due  to  their  faith,  being  deprived  of  the  right  of  public  practice:  thus,  Catholic  citizens  
generally  could  practice  their  faith  with  limitations  only,  furthermore  they  were  not  
allowed  to  undertake  public  offices.219  Not  surprisingly,  the  Southern  provinces  –  Limburg  
and  Brabant  –  with  a  predominantly  Catholic  population  were  ordered  by  the  central  
power  (without  any  precedent  and  with  almost  no  counterpart  yet  in  this  period:  the  
government)  as  conquered  territories.220  These  disadvantageous  measures  albeit  ended  
later,  the  experience  of  hostility  remained:  the  Catholic  segment  continued  to  be  cautious  
and  began  to  organize  themselves  relatively  later  and  rather  half-heartedly.221  By  the  
end  of  pillarization,  the  Catholic  bloc  possessed  the  following  characteristics:  their  
geographical  situation  was  clearly  definable,  moreover,  their  organizational  structure  was  
the  most  fully  developed.  (Although  in  general,  they  did  not  have  much  time  for  the  
organization,  since  not  even  the  ecclesiastical  hierarchy  did  exist  until  1853.222)  The  
division  which  characterised  the  Protestants  was  not  the  case  with  the  Catholics,  since  
parallel  Catholic  institutions  were  absent,  and  the  only  one  in  function  was  strictly  
subordinated  to  the  Dutch  Catholic  clergy.223 
 The  Protestants  –  typically  diverse  in  ideological  sense224  –,  however,  suffered  
from  oppression  –  not  benefiting  from  the  fruits  of  economy  to  the  desired  degree  –  
from  behalf  of  the  Liberals.  Their  dissatisfaction  thus  resulted  in  an  emancipatory  
movement.225  However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  ignore  the  simultaneous  existence  of  
different  Protestant  denominations  at  the  time:  in  1879,  the  54,5%  of  the  population  
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claimed  themselves  to  be  members  of  the  Dutch  Reformed  Church,  but  certain  Protestant  
wings  left  the  mainstream  Church  (the  so-called  Gereformeerd)  in  two  waves  in  the  
19th  century.226  The  construction  of  the  Protestant  pillar’s  institutions  was  due  to  Abraham  
Kuyper’s  newspaper-,  party-  and  university-founding  activity  at  the  end  of  the  19th  
century.227     
 
IV.1.2.  The  secular-ideological  pillar 
Next  to  the  denominational  or  religious  pillars,  the  secular  dimension  also  has  to  be  
mentioned,  and  the  latter  was  given  by  two  further  groups  of  the  Dutch  society  –  those  
are,  the  Liberals  and  the  Social  Democrats.  Since  in  their  case,  one  cannot  talk  about  
significant  religiosity,  a  class-based  interpretation  seems  to  be  the  correct  choice,  instead.  
In  addition,  it  is  also  important  to  be  reminded  of  that  as  the  membership  in  
denominations  was  declining,  although  side  by  side  with  this,  those  who  identified  
themselves  as  without  “a  religious  faith”  was  vigorously  growing.228  The  former  belonged  
to  an  ideologically  heterogeneous229  and  loosely  organised  faction  with  a  wealthy  upper-
class  membership.  Their  political  and  economic  dominance  at  the  time  could  be  explained  
by  the  restricted  suffrage  of  the  19th  and  the  early  20th  centuries.230  However,  as  more  
and  more  –  probably  less  well-off  –  citizens  could  make  their  voice  heard  at  the  polls,  
their  support  lessened.  On  the  organization  of  the  latter  –  the  working  class  –  the  
international  labour  movements  had  an  impact,  according  to  some231,  although  it  is  to  
mention  that  while  most  European  countries  were  undergoing  industrialization  which  
paved  the  way  for  workers  to  organize  themselves  into  a  mass  movement,  and  when  
the  concept  of  socialism  arrived  in  the  Netherlands  through  Germany,  the  country  was  
still  focusing  predominantly  on  agriculture.  By  the  time  the  Netherlands  industrialised  
relatively  late  so  that  the  workers’  attempts  could  have  become  a  reality,  a  substantial  
part  of  them  had  already  been  involved  in  the  Catholic  or  Protestant  organisations.  In  
                                                             
226 These gave first 3.5%, and then 8.2%; this proportion increased for a short time and fell back by 5% at the turn 
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terms  of  its  membership,  lower  middle-class  and  lower-classes  were  characteristic  of  the  
socialist  pillar.232 
 Contrary  to  the  fact  that  each  pillar  was  –  through  their  extensive  institutional  
net  –  in  a  quasi-monopolistic  situation,  there  were,  of  course,  fields  untouched  by  
pillarisation:  for  instance,  press  was  such  a  thing,  which  could  never  be  fully  pillarised.233 
 
 
IV.2.  Depillarisation 
The  system  of  pillars  –  which  in  Lijphart’s  words  functioned  as  the  arrangement  of  
accommodation  –  was  swept  away  by  the  decade  of  1960.  It  would  be,  however,  
misguided  to  investigate  the  phenomenon  of  depillarisation  isolated  from  the  era’s  
dominant  intellectual  and  ideological  streams.  Secularization  and  individualization  forging  
through  the  religious  and  civil  dimensions  of  life  in  this  period  did  have  considerable  
impact  on  the  way  the  Dutch  society  had  been  ordered  in  the  first  half  of  the  20th  
century;  but  first,  it  would  be  in  our  interest  to  enumerate  background  of  the  social  
demands  and  claims  articulating  these  days.234 
 Following  the  Second  World  War  –  which  might  turn  out  to  be  the  origin  of  
the  Dutch  self-interpretation  –  two  markedly  differing  approaches  were  competing  for  
dominance,  in  relation  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  country  torn  and  destructed  equally  
by  the  war  and  the  German  occupation.  First,  closely  coordinated  cooperation  of  
independent  organizations  was  promoted  by  the  more  orthodox  wings  of  Catholics  and  
Protestants;  and  second,  the  establishment  of  a  perpetual  unity  –  thus,  the  idea  of  jointly  
created  organizations  –  was  advocated  by  politically  speaking  more  left-wing  Catholics  
alongside  the  remaining  members  of  the  Protestant  communities.235  The  articulation  of  
the  desire  for  democratization,  as  well  as  the  changes  in  the  practice  of  religion  were  
typical  elements  of  the  post-1945  period.  It  is  first  and  foremost  the  observation  of  
demography  that  during  the  post-war  reconstruction,  a  steep  rise  in  birth  rate  became  
spread  in  Europe  –  just  as  it  reached  the  Netherlands:  the  so-called  ‘baby-boom’  
generation  took  over  political  power  from  its  predecessors  in  the  1960s.236 
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 All  things  considered,  in  Arend  Lijphart’s  point  of  view,  the  further  presence,  
the  survival  of  pillars  was  challenged  by  four  phenomena  from  the  mid-1960s.237  First,  
the  vertically  structured  blocks  lost  their  significance  and  their  impact  on  politics;  partly,  
out  of  a  dissatisfaction  towards  their  own  pillar,  and  partly,  due  to  the  urge  of  national  
unity,  the  individuals  of  each  pillar  began  to  look  around  and  to  connect  with  members  
from  other  segments.  Second,  the  left-wingers  –  whom  ideologically  prevailed  in  this  
period  –  completely  rejected  the  “game  rules”238  of  consociationalism,  and  rearranged  
(or  rather:  refused?)  the  principles  of  the  accommodation  politics.  Third,  the  growing  
curiosity  in  politics  and  the  intensifying  activism  of  the  population  introduced  a  new  
type  of  mentality  and  practices  –  such  as  protestation  or  the  occupation  of  universities239  
–  without  any  precedent.  Finally,  a  general  political  instability  became  a  phenomenon  
simultaneous  to  all  the  above-mentioned:  this  can  be  partly  linked  to  the  formerly  
discussed  civil  disobedience,  the  formation  of  nine  cabinets  between  1965  and  1974  was  
nevertheless  and  undoubtedly  the  sign  of  political  changeability.240 
 Each  pillar  underwent  and  experienced  the  profound  changes  in  a  different  way:  
in  this  wise  did  collapse  the  Catholic  pillar  led  by  a  strong  formal  force,  while  the  
Protestant  denominations  employing  mainly  informal  technics  were  capable  of  giving  
flexible  reactions.241 
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V.    (Re)Pillarisation  in  the  consociational  Netherlands   
Having  overviewed  the  processes  which  profoundly  impacted  the  nature  of  Dutch  politics,  
the  opportunity  to  correlate  these  with  the  theory  and  practice  of  consociational  
democracy,  presents  itself.  Specifically  on  Dutch  consociationalism,  Lijphart  claims  the  
period  of  1914-17  to  be  the  beginning  of  the  consociational  arrangement.  In  these  days,  
two  issues  featured  public  debate,  both  putting  considerable  weight  on  the  elites’  
shoulders  –  those  were,  the  question  of  universal  suffrage  and  the  funding  of  religious  
schools  by  the  state.  While  the  Social  Democrats  made  a  point  of  the  former,  and  the  
latter  was  in  Christian  Democrats’  interests,  the  Liberals  formed  the  opposition  in  both  
cases.  In  both  situations,  it  could  have  gone  without  saying  for  one  party  to  win  over  
the  other  –  just  as  in  the  theory  of  ’zero-sum  game’,  where  if  one  wins,  the  other  
necessarily  loses.  Nevertheless,  the  Netherlands  –  ‘armed’  with  the  consociational  
instruments  –  put  an  end  to  the  controversies  in  a  different  way:  both  matters  were  
solved  by  compromises242,  in  which  every  group  got  some  bits  of  its  initial  
expectations.243  With  the  yielding  of  the  links  between  the  population  and  the  vertical  
units,  in  such  a  society  where  the  hitherto  fragmented  society  seemed  to  be  fusing,  the  
accommodation  of  the  separate  subcultures  lost  of  its  earlier  importance,  hence  did  the  
consociational  instruments  lose  their  validity.  In  contrast  however  –  as  mentions  van  
Dam  –,  on  the  impression  that  “politics-making”  was  turned  upside  down  by  the  
generation  of  the  sixties,  the  1980s  cast  a  doubt.   
 Since  the  beginning  of  the  third  millennium,  however,  new  types  of  cleavages  
have  generated  or  catalysed  already  existing  divisions.  Approximately  five  decades  after  
the  pillars  have  lost  their  actual  sense,  de  Been  reminded  us  in  2012:  “consociationalism  
has  many  features  that  make  it  relevant  for  the  cultural  and  religious  divisions  of  the  
21st  century,”  as  long  as  in  the  recent  decades,  “[t]he  revolution  in  information  and  
communication  technology  has  changed  the  habitat  in  which  minorities  exist.”244  With  
the  Netherlands  in  mind,  the  statement  might  have  force  as  well  as  considerable  
relevance,  if  one  has  in  mind  that  this  country,  although  with  a  unique  approach  to  
immigrants  perhaps  due  to  more  earlier  experience  with  Muslims245  –  similarly  to  many  
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other  European  examples  –,  have  not  triumphed  in  the  integration  of  its  populous  
immigrant  communities. 
It  is  a  widely-known  and  frequently-repeated  story,  how  the  number  of  immigrants  
arriving  to  –  predominantly,  Western  –  Europe  has  expanded  in  the  last  decades:  the  
first  immigrants  arrived  in  the  continent  since  the  1960s  –  initially  from  North  Africa  
–,  either  as  guest  workers  or  “through  colonial  ties.”246  By  now,  however,  the  
Netherlands’  Muslim  community  have  undoubtedly  grown  out  the  category  of  temporary  
workers.  Their  presence  is  permanent,  which  can  be  described  by  the  group’s  size  of  
900  000  people  and  the  construction  of  about  450  mosques  by  the  end  of  2016.  With  
regard  to  their  composition,  it  is  to  lay  that  the  two  most  significant  minorities  in  the  
Netherlands  are  either  of  Moroccan  or  Turkish  background,  the  majority  of  whom  claim  
themselves  to  be  Muslims.247  It  is  crucial  to  note,  that  –  as  is  already  mentioned  above  
–  immigrants  during  these  decades  arrived  to  a  country  which  had  gone  through  the  
process  of  rapid  and  massive  secularization  –  a  process  which  resulted  in  a  social  
arrangement,  potentially  incompatible  with  immigrants  of  a  Muslim  background.248   
On  the  one  hand,  Koopmans  and  Statham  gives  a  vague  explanation  to  this  
unfortunate  situation:  the  policies  originally  aimed  at  integrating  the  masses,  resulted  in  
an  effect,  opposing  to  what  Dutch  authorities  initially  had  in  mind.  In  short,  these  
measurements  often  reinforced  the  discrepancies,  thus  they  proved  to  be  rather  counter-
productive.249  On  the  other  hand,  de  Been  explains  the  Netherlands’  failure  in  integrating  
its  immigrants  with  two  more  specific  reasons.  First,  as  providers  of  a  temporary  
solution,  and  if  so,  there  was,  in  fact,  not  much  sense  to  accommodate  complete  realities  
and  commitments;  second,  the  immigrant  crowds  were  falsely  identified  as  “indigenous,  
sub-state  minorities”  –  furthermore,  these  groups  were  addressed  policies  to,  according  
to  the  same  principle,  refers  de  Been  to  Kymlicka,  the  original  owner  of  the  thought.250   
The  core  argument  in  de  Been’s  article  is  that  due  to  broad  Internet  availability,  
immigrants  can  be  in  direct  and  continuous  contact  with  their  original  country,  read  the  
local  newspapers  or  watch  online  version  of  television  programmes.251  Reading  his  line  
of  reasoning,  we  may  recall  the  newspapers,  schools  and  television  channels  of  the  old  
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pillars  of  the  20th  century.252  Similar  are  the  observations  of  Schrover:  the  author  comes  
up  with  the  term  “cultural  freezing”,  which  is  suggested  to  be  the  result  of  decades  of  
applying  the  multicultural  approach.  Also,  multiculturalism  is  seen  to  allow  ethnic  
minorities  to  act  and  behave  “as  groups”.253  Additionally,  he  presents  a  ‘Muslim  pillar’  
which  is  now  in  possession  of  the  essential  institutional  background  –  and  which  built  
its  organizational  infrastructure  following  the  Dutch  example.254  Andeweg  and  Irwin  
argue,  however,  that  the  new  division  that  the  Dutch  society  has  witnessed,  depends  
rather  on  how  people  approach  and  evaluate  multiculturalism.  Hence,  they  seem  to  refuse  
the  idea  of  the  emergence  of  a  new  ethnic  pillarization  with  separate  autochtonen  (it  
means,  native)  and  allochtonen  (this  expression  used  to  serve  to  describe  immigrants,  
but  the  Dutch  government  ceased  this  practice  in  2016255)  blocs.256  Later,  de  Been  goes  
as  far  as  to  envisage  the  articulation  of  a  parallel  society  by  assuming  “the  ability  of  
marginal  groups  to  construct  alternative  identities”,  at  the  same  time,  refusing  the  idea  
as  optimal.257  It  is  just  as  important  to  note,  however,  that  none  of  the  aforementioned  
authors  saw  the  establishment  of  neither  the  Denk,  nor  the  BIJ1  –  with  this  development  
–  that  is,  organizing  their  own  political  elite  –,  as  suggested  here,  might  be  understood  
as  another  step  towards  it. 
Dutch  mainstream  politicians  gave  an  altogether  belated  reaction.  Traditionally  
committed  to  tolerance,  no  political  decisions  or  measurements  were  taken  for  
approximately  three  decades,  the  reason  being  that  immigration  and  their  integration  
used  to  be  one  of  the  taboos  of  the  second  half  of  the  last  century.  Among  politicians  
of  established  parties,  Frits  Bolkestein  was  the  first  to  give  voice  to  his  worries,  and  
to  doubt  if  the  Netherlands  would  find  a  solution  to  the  problem  –  or  to  even  recognize  
the  problem  of  the  “underpoliticized”  treatment  of  immigrants.258  Then,  as  we  will  see,  
populists  took  over  the  case  of  immigration.  By  recent  years,  the  above  have  led  
mainstream  Dutch  politics  to,  sort  of,  fall  into  the  other  extreme:  the  Dutch  requirements  
are  believed  to  be  one  of  to  strictest  in  Europe.  Besides,  even  Prime  Minister  Mark  
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Rutte  has  had  some  scandalous  comments.259  Eelco  Harteveld,  the  Dutch  political  scientist  
–  without  promoting  nationalist  sentiments,  of  course  –  analyzing  the  figure  of  Thierry  
Baudet  to  a  Hungarian  journalist,  argued  that  an  articulated  and  expressed  Dutch  identity  
could  even  help  the  integration  of  the  immigrant  communities,  since  not  having  such  
might  lead  –  as  it  might  already  have  led  –  to  confusion  in  what  concerns  the  
immigrants’  orientation.260  However,  one  could  mention  that  there  is  a  well-contoured  
Dutch  identity:  one  which  defines  itself  as  the  protector  of  rights  and  liberal  values,  
and  as  the  promoter  of  tolerance.261  Again  –  to  point  to  how  controversial  the  topic  is  
–,  one  could  remind  the  others:  there  have  been  populists  to  emphasise  it.262       
Some  observers  of  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century  held  it  possible  that  the  
instruments  and  technics  of  cooperation  never  disappeared  from  political  practice  –  
rather,  they  were  less  salient  during  the  seventies.  Van  Dam,  already  quoted  hereby,  –  
supporting  this  claim  –  refers  to  historical  continuity.  Indeed:  it  is  striking  to  see  that  
while  in  the  1960s  some  fundamental  social  dynamics  –  individualism  and  secularism,  
among  others  –  provoked  crucial  changes  in  the  nature  of  society,  the  2000s  have  
witnessed  some  impacts  of  globalism263,  as  well  as  some  developments  of  the  latest  
chapter  of  modernisation  (that  is,  in  communication  technology).264  We  may  thus  pose  
the  following  question  (paraphrasing  the  law  of  energy  conservation):  consociationalism  





                                                             
259 To bring one example, we mention here his “Act normal or leave!”. One could hardly neglect the negative 
connotation of his words – even in spite of his defense. (Kroet, 2017) 
260 Bérczes, 2019 
261 Cammaerts, 2018, 9 
262 A number of Wilder’s public statements would be worth to be mentioned. (Bot, 2017)  
263 Some believe that we should talk about a sort of double effect of globalism, considering that the very arrival of 
immigrants was one of the consequences of globalism. (Cherribi, 2010, 59) 
264 In de Been’s words: “The revolution in information and communication technology has changed the habitat in 
which minorities exist.” (de Been, 2012, 531) 





VI.  The  Dutch  party  families:  Variations  to  the  same  theme?266 
As  we  have  mentioned  earlier,  a  feature  of  the  Dutch  domestic  politics  in  the  19th  
century  was  a  clear  liberal  dominance:  the  liberal  politicians  induced  two  political  
conflicts  in  thirty  years.  These  discords  in  effect  contributed  to  the  establishment  of  the  
traditional  parliamentary  parties.  For  the  first  time,  in  1848  –  in  the  heat  of  the  
constitutionalisation  and  democratisation,  a  vast  global  wave  –  the  liberal  camp  wished  
to  extend  those  rights  to  the  practitioners  of  any  religion  which  had  been  the  exclusive  
privileges  of  Protestants.267  Later,  for  the  second  time,  the  school  question  –  which,  
compared  to  Belgium,  was  brought  on  the  agenda  earlier  –  gave  incentives  to  the  
foundation  of  parties:  within  the  liberal  group  –  the  government  party  at  the  time  –  an  
agreement  was  reached  according  to  which  the  financial  support  of  private  schools  would  
have  been  banned  by  law.268  The  dissolution  first  of  the  Christian-conservative,  and  then  
the  liberal  factions  to  different  wings  is  also  to  be  linked  to  the  19th  century.  By  the  
turn  of  the  century,  the  workers  had  awakened,  and  the  divisions  within  this  class  had  
begun  to  move  away  along  the  issues  as  agricultural  production  of  essential  importance  
for  the  Netherlands  and  the  attitudes  towards  the  liberal  trend  and  religious  education.269 
 On  the  one  hand,  the  20th  century  brought  with  it  the  conciliation  of  the  
denominational  parties  and  the  liberals  –  what  is  more,  they  managed  to  reach  a  
consensual  cooperation.  Their  coalition  remained  in  power  until  the  end  of  the  1960s,  
Social  Democrats  occasionally  joining  them.  On  the  other  hand,  due  to  a  change  in  
their  image,  the  Labour  Party  grew  into  a  people’s  party  aspiring  for  the  support  of  
broader  masses.270  Following  the  Second  World  War  –  bearing  the  urge  of  the  national  
unity’s  reconstruction  in  mind  –  the  Dutch  politics  was  leaning  towards  consensual  
democracy,  again.  In  this  light,  the  cooperation  of  the  Catholic  and  Labour  Party  did  
not  seem  astonishing  anymore.  The  considerable  growth  in  the  number  of  parties  is  a  
significant  development  of  the  post-war  period,  and  was  given  an  impetus  to  in  the  
1970s.  The  cathartic  transformations  –  as  discussed  hereby  in  an  earlier  chapter  –  
beginning  in  the  mid-1950s,  not  only  weakened  the  influence  of  denominational  parties,  
                                                             
266 Galen A. Andeweg and Rudy B. Irwin used this expression in their volume published in 2009 (Governance and 
Politics in the Netherlands, Macmillan, London, 2009), referring to the general pattern, according to which parties 
– or rather, party families – take core ideas and values as given, although their interpretations can be numerous 
and different, altogether, nuanced. (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 56)   
267 Their draft did not meet the acceptance needed, thus as the consequence of the further growing conflict was the 
establishment of some new parties. (Flamm, 2004, 275)   
268 Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, 40 
269 Flamm, 2004, 276  




but  also  affected  the  relationship  between  liberals  and  the  left-wing  camp.  The  former  
camp  –  as  a  result  of  ideological  differences  –  confronted  with  the  Social  Democrats,  
whom  had  developped  into  the  main  left-wing  power  in  the  country.  Following  these  
developments,  the  Dutch  governance  could  be  featured  by  abrupt  changes  of  government,  
by  general  instability  lasting  for  two  decades.271 
 An  additional  characteristic  of  the  Dutch  party  system  is  that  it  provides  room  
for  lots  of  political  groups  to  perform:  accordingly,  on  certain  broader  ideological  strands,  
a  number  of  parties  have  been  founded.272  Furthermore,  according  to  Sartori’s  typology  
the  Dutch  party  system  is  to  be  classified  as  an  “extreme  multi-party”  one.273  Considering  
the  fact  that  in  the  Netherlands  candidates  can  be  registrated  without  considerable  
difficulty,  and  that  the  treshold  for  the  parliamentary  seats,  the  number  of  parties  making  
it  into  the  legislation  has  typically  hovered  around  ten,  so  far  in  the  third  millenium.274  
The  1990s  brought  with  it  an  innovation  in  the  establishment  of  the  ’single  issues’  
parties.  A  common  feature  of  these  is  that  they  are  founded  on  one  topic,  addressing  
exclusively  one  issue:  the  General  Elderly  Alliance  (in  Dutch:  Algemeen  Ouderen  
Verbond)  and  one  advocating  the  rights  of  the  animals  (that  is,  Party  for  the  Animals;  
in  Dutch:  Partij  voor  de  Dieren)  are  instances  of  this  characteristic,  also  elivening  
participants  of  the  (thus)  diverse  Lower  House.275  The  fact  that  the  Dutch  governance  
has  been  enriched  by  some  historically  settled  traditions  adds  further  nuances  to  the  
picture  on  may  have  of  the  Netherlands’  political  culture:  besides  the  pragmatism  and  
the  tendency  and  willingness  of  consensus276,  another  unique  feature  has  been  the  
involvement  of  non-governmental  bodies  in  the  decision-making.277   
  
                                                             
271 Lijphart, 1975, 201   
272 Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 56   
273 Sartori, 1976, 196 in: Evans, 2002, 156; Peters, 1998, 215 
274 Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 56; 66-67   
275 It is well exemplified by the fact that before the latest national elections in 2017, there were five one-member 
formations in the lower house (the composition of which is available at: Houseofrepresentatives.nl). (Flamm, 2004, 
285 
276 Although these have been discussed in the literature as separate features, it might by no chance be impossible 
that there is a noticeable and significant relation: that would be understandable if the intention of cooperation were 
in fact the precondition of practical decision-making in a divided society.  





VI.1.  Populist  politics278  and  immigrant  parties  in  the  Netherlands 
In  an  earlier  passage,  we  have  already  stated  the  anti-establishment  nature  of  the  
opposition  in  the  states  ‘playing’  the  consociational  instruments,  as  arised  the  supposition  
of  a  topical  challenge  of  consociationalism  in  contemporary  times  (that  we  suggest  to  
happen,  the  latest,  in  the  future).  In  an  attempt  to  the  introduction  of  the  parallel  
realisation  of  the  above-mentioned  phenomena,  it  is  wortwhile  in  this  section  of  the  
thesis  to  review  the  evolution  of  the  Dutch  radical  right-wing,  called  into  being  by  the  
wave  of  depillarisation.  As  Oudenampsen  observes:  “[t]he  emergence  of  right-wing  
populism  has  occured  in  a  crisis  of  a  similar  nature  and  magnitude  as  that  of  the  1960s,  
with  almost  the  entire  political  field  experiencing  major  instability.”279  Hence,  such  an  
intention  is  viable,  provided  the  fact  that  this  school  emerged  as  the  potential  expression  
of  the  social  division  –  hence,  as  the  current  challenge  of  consociationalism.  Our  attempt  
is  perhaps  even  more  valid,  did  we  suppose  that  parties  similar  to  the  Party  for  Freedom  
in  character  and  message  –  namely,  Eurosceptism  and  anti-immigration  –  were  
simultaneously  founded  across  the  entire  European  continent  –  they  offer  themselves  for  
analysis  and  comparison.280 
 In  terms  of  the  roots  of  populist  trends,  Pim  Fortuyn’s  appearance  can  be  taken  
as  a  milestone  at  the  dawn  of  the  2000s.  Initially,  the  politician  was  the  leading  
candidate  of  Livable  Netherlands’  (in  Dutch:  Leefbaar  Nederland)  list  drawn  up  for  the  
2002  elections,  the  group  being  a  hostile  opposite  pole  to  the  government,  in  fact,  to  
the  political  establishment.  After  all,  due  to  his  extremist  statements,  his  colleagues  
turned  away.  Following  his  expulsion  from  the  organisation,  Fortuyn  framed  a  list  under  
his  own  name  (the  Lijst  Pim  Fortuyn;  henceforward:  LPF),  still,  preparing  for  the  
                                                             
278 Regarding the hardly tangible nature of populism – as already dealt with in the theoretical framework –, it is 
worth dwelling shortly on what exactly makes it viable to label Wilders – whose character is already difficult to 
classify – as populist. (Not even mentioning, that people usually have a hard time defining the term ’populist’ 
itself.) Although ’populism’ is frequently used as a synonym for the radical right, one should be cautious not to 
link Wilders – initially a liberal parliamentary representative – automatically to the right-wing’s ideology. Basing 
on Eatwell and Andeweg & Irwin on the pages of this thesis the term under question is approached as a broad one 
– that is, we refer to it as a political actor who seems to detect and react to what the population wants in their 
rhetoric, but at the same time, as someone who can be less tied to traditional ideological schools. We suppose that 
such an approach is true in Geert Wilders’ case. (Eatwell, 2004, 11; Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 66)  
279 Oudenampsen, 2013, 202 
280 Despite the fact that we – as already made clear – comprehend Geert Wilders fitting the above-described 
populist category, there are some aspects which make him a different case when compared with others 
contemporary populist politicians. One of these elements is that he has been supportive of Israel and the United 
States of America, the extent of importance he attaches to foreign policy. Another element of Wilders’ 
“uniqueness” are his libertarian stances in moral issues: in connection with this, it is noticeable that the stressing 
of liberal values is contrasted with the Islam as culturally backward. (Vossen, 2011, 186-187; Oudenampsen, 2013, 




elections  in  2002.  After  his  death,  his  party  made  an  excellent  debut  by  achieving  
victory  –  so  much  so  that  the  Christian  Democrats  and  Liberals  invited  them  to  be  a  
part  of  their  government.  Yet,  as  a  governing  force  they  were  a  failure,  thus  early  
elections  became  necessary,  on  which  they  did  not  even  get  close  to  victory.  (Namely,  
they  had  lost  approximately  12%  of  the  earlier  support.)281  After  the  chaotic  beginning  
of  the  new  millenium  –  slowly  approaching  the  contemporary  period  of  domestic  politics  
–,  two  more  initiatives  are  worth  of  being  mentioned  here.  Both  Rita  Verdonk’s  and  
Geert  Wilders’s  independent  political  career  commenced  after  their  quit  from  the  liberal  
People’s  Party  for  Freedom  and  Democracy  (in  Dutch:  Volkspartij  voor  Vrijheid  en  
Democratie;  henceforward:  VVD)282.  The  latter,  infamous  for  his  scandalous  xenophobic  
statements  concerning  in  particular  Islam  and  Muslims,  with  the  establishment  of  PVV  
in  2006  has  been  an  eccentric  personality  in  the  Dutch  political  spectrum:  not  only  does  
his  party  lack  the  organisational  structure,  he  is  also  the  only  member  in  this  party.283  
In  xenophobia,  Wilders  went  so  far,  that  he  was  convicted  in  December  2016,  due  to  
his  hate  speech  aimed  at  Muslim  immigrants.284  Authentically  of  a  populist  opinion  
leader,  he  turned  to  a  rather  typical  populist  tool  by  accusing  the  court  of  hindering  
the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  speech.285  Not  long  after  his  appearance,  in  2008,  
Wilders’  rival  arrived  at  the  political  starting  line  furthering  an  independent  initiative:  
Rita  Verdonk,  one  of  Prime  Minister  Mark  Rutte’s  critics  has  –  standing  up  against  the  
concept  of  cultural  relativism  –  advocated  the  traditional  Dutch  values,  and  has  promoted  
a  set  of  altogether  conservative  values.286  Wilders  –  although  gaining  the  second  most  
seats  in  2017  –  was  not  invited  to  be  part  of  the  governing  coalition,  the  populist  
politician  has  been  surrounded  by  a  cordon  sanitaire.287   
At  the  end  of  the  day,  Geert  Wilders  is  not  the  latest  populist  “ringleader”:  with  
Thierry  Baudet  on  the  scene,  populist  voters  now  have  an  alternative  (although,  still  a  
populist  one).288  As  it  turned  out  in March 2019,  Baudet’s  party  –  which  is  in  fact  a  
                                                             
281 During the campaign, his colleagues could not keep up with him in terms of rhetoric, thus the competition soon 
became rather heated. The politician was shot in May of 2002. Beside his party’s incapability in giverning properly 
another element for their poor performance might have been that the parties of the establishment began to consider 
some of the topics – these are, immigration and the integration of the immigrants – formerly exclusively touched 
upon by the LPF. (Harmsen, 2003, 2; Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 64)   
282 The VVD is a liberal party, the leader of which is Prime Minister Marc Rutte. The VVD has governed the 
country as part of a coalition next to the D66, the Christian Democratic Appeal and the Christian Union since 
October of 2017, following an unprecedently long series of coalition talks. (Henley, 2017) 
283 Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 66; Vossen, 2011, 179   
284 Darroch, 2016 
285 Cammaerts, 2018, 13 
286 Oudenampsen, 2013, 204   
287 Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015, 1144; Teffer, 2017 




newcomer  –,  the  Forum  for  Democracy  (in  Dutch:  Forum  voor  Democratie;  
henceforward:  FvD)  gained  a  significant  victory  at  the  provincial  elections,  overtaking  
even  Rutte’s  VVD  and  convincing  some  of  PVV’s  supporters.289  The  author  of  news  
page  Politico,  Eline  Schaart  referred  to  him  as  “[a]s  an  intellectual  Geer  Wilders.”  Even  
if  different  in  tone  and  manner,  the  main  themes  and  stances  are  the  same  in  core:  
among  its  priorities  the  FvD  has  anti-immigrant  and  strongly  Eurosceptic  stances.  
However  –  as  Schaart  calls  our  attention  –,  Baudet  is  part  of  specifically  that  political  
élite  that  Wilders  –  and  populist  globally  –  has  mobilised  his  initiation  against.290       
 Another  significant  development  of  recent  years  was  the  establishment  of  a  party  
the  membership  of  which  is  built  up  by  immigrants.  The  Denk  grew  out  of  the  Labour  
Party  after  leaving  the  latter  in  2015.  In  social  and  economic  terms,  the  party  draws  
on  its  social  democratic  heritage  and  takes  its  decisions  on  left-wing  stances  –  however,  
culturally-religiously  and  ethnically  speaking,  it  claims  to  be  plural,  and  thus  forms  an  
inclusive  camp  for  immigrants.291  With  three  seats  in  the  present  legislative  power,  the  
Denk  has  been  the  first  to  achieve  such  a  success,  since  no  earlier  attempts  of  immigrant  
organisations  had  managed  to  make  it  to  the  House  of  Representatives  before  2017.292  
It  is  known  that  the  party  rejects  the  idea  of  assimilation  in  which  some  worry  their  
potential  to  create  and  support  the  survival  of  a  parallel  society  of  immigrants.293  Should  
these  suppositions  turn  out  to  be  true,  the  worries  of  Wouter  de  Been  would  realise294:  
the  professor  of  the  Erasmus  University  Rotterdam  concludes  that  contemporary  
immigrants  do  not  have  to  actually  break  away  from  their  countries  of  origin.  Quite  the  
contrary:  taking  the  opportunities  of  modern  communication  technology  –  such  as,  the  
mass  media,  global  Internet  availability  and  online  social  networks  –,  the  certain  layers  
of  immigrant  population  can  virtually  live  a  life  as  the  would  in  their  home  country.  
Namely,  they  may  build  up  the  illusion  of  being  surrounded  by  other  members  of  the  
same  ethnic-religious  group,  being  aware  of  and  taking  sides  in  issues  concerning  
countries  of  origin;  in  short  –  as  if  they  have  never  left  their  original  country.295  Earlier,  
the  party  did  not  function  as  an  exclusively  Muslim  party;  instead,  as  we  pointed  to  it,  
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291 Otjes & Krouwel, 2018, 6 
292 Ibid 1 
293 Duke, 2017 
294 At the time of writing his article we are referring here (Wouter de Been (2012): Continuity or regime change 
in the Netherlands: Consociationalism in a deterritorialized and post-secular world. In: Ethnicities, Vol. 12, No. 5, 
pp. 231-555, 2012) – in 2012 –, de Been could not yet see the actual articulation and breakthrough of an immigrant-
composed party.  




it  used  to  be  a  cross-ethnic  or  cross-religion  initiative.  This  was  exemplified  for  instance  
by  the  involvement  of  Sylvana  Simons  –  a  television  presenter  in  the  Netherlands  –,  
since  she  is  of  Surinamese  origin.  Nonetheless,  Simons  organised  her  own  immigrant  
party,  the  Article  1  in  2016,  the  name  of  which  she  changed  to  BIJ1  a  year  later.  As  
a  leader  of  this  party,  she  focuses  mainly  on  women’s  emancipation  and  the  rights  of  
the  LGBT-community.296   
What  has  passed  by  far  in  the  third  millenium  has  already  held  some  lessons.  
Somewhat  harmonizing  with  the  already  introduced,  constant  feature  of  Dutch  political  
culture,  nowadays  even  populist  politics  offers  alternatives  to  the  electorate  –  these  can  
be  referred  to  as,  simply  put,  a  more  and  a  less  sophisticated  one.  Similarly,  with  the  
quit  of  Sylvana  Simons,  there  are  now  two  parties  founded  by  immigrants.  Furthermore,  
the  Denk  –  organised  by  former  Turkish  members297  of  the  Labour  Party  –  has  attracted  
voters  from  the  Labour  Party  which  traditionally  advocates  social  democratic  policies.298  
It  is  a  salient  feature  of  the  Dutch  party  system,  which  suggests  that  parties  traditionally  
prone  to  cooperate  or  even  enter  into  alliances  with  political  forces  from  another  pole  
more  or  less  regardless  of  their  ideological  position  –  the  latter,  in  the  name  of  pragmatic  
policy-making,  whereas  within  their  own  party  family,  even  slight  nuances  of  ideological  
difference  might  lead  to  fragmentation.299  Moreover,  based  on  the  fact  that  both  Verdonk  
and  Wilders  launched  their  own  movements  after  they  had  quit  their  former  well-
functioning  parliamentary  parties,  one  might  assume  that  it  seems  as  if  extremist  views  
could  not  remain  within  parties.  In  a  broader  view,  there  is  an  exclusion  altogether  for  
parties  founded  on  extremist  grounds:  namely  –  with  the  exception  of  Pim  Fortuyn’s  
initiative  –,  the  parties  of  establishment  have  managed  to  keep  them  away  from  the  
governing  position. 
 
  
                                                             
296 Otjes & Krouwel, 2018, 7 
297 They are, more precisely: Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk. (Otjes & Krouwel, 2018, 6)  
298 According to certain streams, classifying ideologies in the left-right spectrum has become rather outdated by 
today, thus their recent losses of votes is a sign of a general shift. There are some who believe that the globalism-
localism dichotomy makes more sense (like Yuval Noah Harari, 2018: 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. Jonathan 
Cape, London, 2018), while others – as Goodhart, eminently – see a distinction between ’Anywhere’ and 
’Somewhere’ people as meaningful (that is, concretely, David Goodhart, 2017: The Road to Somewhere: The 
Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics. C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 2017); indeed, the terms in 
which contemporary authors think and write do no have much to do with the classical typology of ideologies. 
299 The so-called ’purple coalition’ perfectly exemplifies the former, why the latter – as an inter-pillar feature – 
happened several times. (For example, such a thing happened with the Liberals: this bloc originally organised 




Conclusion:  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  under  the  “populist  threat”300 
In  the  present  thesis,  it  was  our  primary  ambition  to  explore  and  explain  the  relation  
between  the  parties  of  the  established  and  the  populist  factions,  which  appeared  on  the  
political  scene  as  the  anti-system  challengers  of  the  establishment.  As  well,  in  view  of  
the  above-written,  we  hope,  that  through  the  case  studies,  the  line  of  evolution  which  
manifested  in  the  last  century  in  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  has  become  apparent  
and  comprehensible.  Such  an  attempt  was  held  to  be  of  considerable  relevance,  as  the  
different  roots  and  incentives  of  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  lessons  provide  elements  of  the  
present  and  future  validity  the  consociational  arrangement  in  the  countries  under  question.   
Although  many  points  of  the  thesis  discuss  political  culture  and  traditions  with  
regard  to  history,  crises  of  government  formation  are,  nonetheless,  frequent  phenomena  
of  contemporary  political  developments,  which  happened  in  the  Low  Countries  in  recent  
years.  It  is  known  that  both  countries’  political  practice  features  that  they  turn  to  
consociational  tools  only  occasionally.  This  statement  is  exemplified  by  the  school  
question  being  the  confrontation  of  the  denominations  and  liberals,  which  catalysed  the  
establishment  of  parties,  as  well.  However,  the  recent  difficulty  in  forming  a  government  
encourages  us  to  reconsider  the  applicability  and  relevance  of  consociationalism.  As  a  
matter  of  fact,  a  question  may  carry  a  new  type  of  uncertainty  concerning  the  essence  
of  consociational  instruments:  are  they  made  specifically  for  crisis  management,  or  –  to  
put  it  differently  –  could  consociationalism  ever  manifest  in  situations  lacking  crises? 
 Following  the  structure  of  the  theoretical  framework  –  regarding  the  fact  that  the  
consociational  arrangement  requires  significant  contribution  from  behalf  of  political  elites  
–  we  introduced  the  imprints  of  pillarisation  left,  first,  on  the  Belgian,  second,  on  the  
Dutch  party  system.  The  fermentation  in,  and  the  breakaway  of  the  sections  of  traditional  
parties  in  Belgium  were  consequences  of  linguistic-cultural  and  ethnic  differences  –,  
similarly  to  the  later  organized  regionalist  movements.  In  the  Netherlands,  however,  
these  were  rather  ideological  nuances  to  lead  to  splits.  Additionally,  Belgium  and  the  
Netherlands  share  another  attribute:  lately,  certain  radical  right-wing  and  populist  forces  
rose  in  both  countries.  Politicians  of  such  initiatives  put  the  independent  Flanders  on  
the  agenda  in  Belgium  –  in  the  Netherlands,  they  target  their  numerous  immigrant  
masses,  or  the  failure  concerning  the  relevant  policies.  As  indicated  at  the  end  of  our  
definition  of  populism,  both  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  provide  distinct  contexts  for  
populist  initiatives.  Cammaerts’s  2018  article  observes  specifically  the  features  of  
                                                             




populism  in  the  Low  Countries.301  In  his  recent  study,  he  –  among  others  –  explores  
the  main  differences  between  the  features  of  the  Flemish  and  the  Dutch  populist  course  
through  the  example  of  the  Flemish  Interest  in  Flanders  and  the  Party  for  Freedom  in  
the  Netherlands.  Following  this  comparison,  we  might  devide  the  observed  characteristics  
into  three  groups.  First,  there  is  a  difference  in  the  period  of  time  when  the  VB  and  
PVV  emerged  and  attracted  a  large  number  of  voters  for  the  first  time.  While  the  
former  was  a  popular  movement  during  the  1990s,  the  latter  came  along  with  the  
general  rise  of  the  extreme  right-wing  forces  after  a  decade,  in  the  2000s.  Second,  the  
scope  or  extension  of  these  initiatives  is  also  different:  in  this  case,  the  subnational  
nature  of  the  VB  contrasts  the  rather  “civic  nationalism”302  in  the  PVV’s  representation.  
Finally,  the  actual  theme  or  content  of  the  VB  differs  from  what  the  PVV  is  focused  
at:  that  is  to  say,  in  the  centre  of  Flemish  nationalism,  cultural  and  ethnic  motivations  
lie,  whereas  a  fundamental  respect  for  civic  values  provide  the  core  of  Dutch  
nationalism.303   
It  is  clearly  visible,  that  in  the  Netherlands  as  a  unitary  state  the  societal  segments  
never  distanced  so  dramatically,  since  here  the  idea  of  federalization  never  occurred  –  
unlike  in  Belgium.  Conversely,  there  was  not  any  other  way  to  keep  the  Belgian  state  
–  which  ceased  to  be  a  unitary  state  long  ago  –  together;  hence  the,  to  day,  six  state  
reforms  have  proven  to  be  necessary  conditions  for  the  coexistence  of  subnational  units.  
In  a  sense  –  in  terms  of  managing  segmentation  –  the  counterpart  of  this  process  was  
pillarisation.  We  can  observe  that  while  in  the  core  of  the  Belgian  pillarisation,  the  
concept  of  linguistic  and  ethnic  emancipation  stood,  the  same  process  of  the  Netherlands  
was  induced  and  catalysed  by  a  cleavage  nurtured  by  religious-ideological  or  
denominational-secular  differences.  It  leads  us  to  conclude  that  while  Belgium  is  
segmented  horizontally  –  in  an  economic  and  ethnic  aspect  –,  the  Netherlands  is  an  
instance  of  vertical  segmentation.304    
Religion  and  ideology  had  different  impacts  on  the  segments’  accommodation  in  
the  two  cases  under  question.  First,  in  Belgium  –  as  an  early-industrialized  society  –  
related  to  the  Netherlands  where  industrialization  went  under  somewhat  later,  the  labour  
movement  appeared  at  an  earlier  time.  Although  in  Belgium’s  northern  neighbour,  
denominations  used  to  have  more  significance  considering  the  fact  that  religious  Dutch  
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workers  had  been  included  in  these  organizations  –  those  were,  under  the  political  elites  
belonging  to  denominations  –,  before  development  of  the  proletariat’s  movement  could  
become  relevant  and  influential.  To  a  certain  extent,  it  seemingly  contradicts  the  vertical  
closeness  of  the  Dutch  pillars,  that  they  were  not  substantially  separated  in  geographical  
terms  –  except  for  the  two  southern  Catholic  provinces,  Limburg  and  Brabant.  The  
experience  of  the  Belgian  geographical  integration  has  witnessed  its  opposite:  whereas  
Wallonia  has  traditionally  been  the  stronghold  of  socialist  streams,  Flanders  is  typically  
the  bastion  of  Christian  Democracy  and  Catholicism;  however,  their  segregation  never  
was  significant  compared  to  the  Dutch  pillars.305  It  is  noticeable  that  consociational  
features  –  since  they  get  a  different  context,  another  nature  in  both  countries  –  are  far  
from  making  the  these  consociational  democracies  uniformed.  Belgium  and  the  
Netherlands  equally  exemplify  the  consociational  order  in  developed  multicultural  
countries,  however,  their  experience  with  consociationalism  may  encourage  further  
countries  –  as  it  has  already  happened,  among  others,  in  Lebanon  and  Surinam306  –  
having  decided  to,  perhaps  imminently,  step  on  the  way  of  democratization.     
 Above,  we  have  found  that  our  initial  hypothesis  was  confirmed.  First,  the  
appearance  of  both  the  VB  and  the  PVV  has  resulted  in  the  mainstream  parties  borrowing  
items  from  the  populist  agenda.  This  way,  today  not  only  the  VB  is  concerned  with  
Flemish  independence,  as  not  only  the  PVV  is  the  black  sheep  among  Dutch  politicians  
with  its  fierce  anti-immigration  rhetoric.  In  the  Belgian  case,  the  case  of  Flanders’s  
independence  is  presented  with  great  success  by  the  N-VA,  while  in  the  Dutch  one,  
recently  the  VVD  has  had  firm  statements  concerning  the  immigrant  population,  which  
might  remind  us  of  the  populist  tone.  At  the  same  time,  there  has  been  a  significant  
difference  between  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands:  while  the  Flemish  VB  was  obliged  to  
soften  its  xenophobic  rhetoric  according  to  a  Belgian  law,  in  2004,  PVV  has  not  had  
such  a  turn,  to  day.  (Also,  we  cannot  talk  about  the  Dutch  counterpart  of  this  particular  
law  –  even  though,  there  was  a  legal  reaction  to  Wilders’s  hate  speech.)  In  conclusion,  
it  is  fair  to  say  that  populist  parties  have  a  Janus-faced,  controversial  impact  on  the  
politics  of  traditional  parties.  The  second  layer  of  the  question  concerned  the  attitudes  
of  the  consociational  establishment.  It  is  taken  as  given  in  Belgium  as  in  the  Netherlands  
that  none  of  the  competing  parties  can  gain  the  majority  of  votes,  so  that  they  could  
form  a  government  alone,  without  alliances.  The  consequent  pressure  of  coalitions  in  an  
era  which  has  left  room  for  populist  forces,  seems  to  have  the  following  effect:  it  is  
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capable  to  keep  the  veritably  radical  elements  away  from  a  governing  position,  since  
the  instrument  of  the  cordon  sanitaire  is  at  the  disposal  of  (more)  moderate  parties.  
Accordingly,  it  has  become  possible  to  leave  out  the  unwanted  parties  as  coalition  
partners.  Hence,  radical  parties  can  be  prevented  from  getting  close  to  the  parliamentary  
decisions-making.  More  concretely,  that  is  to  say,  once  a  member  of  Parliament,  they  
might  disarrange  the  democratic  framework,  which  possibility  might  potentially  threaten  
the  Netherlands,  as  there  is  not  any  worthwhile  legal  barrier  for  competing  parties  and  
lists  in  the  country’s  electoral  system.  It  somehow  nuances  the  tool  of  government  
formation,  that  grand  coalitions  has  been  put  out  of  both  the  Belgian  and  the  Dutch  
practice,  lately.307  In  the  relevant  chapters,  we  have  seen  the  unstable  electoral  support  
of  either  the  VB  and  the  PVV.  In  the  Belgian  case,  the  Flemish  party  has  been  losing  
voters  to  the  N-VA’s  favour,  while  in  the  Dutch  one,  Thierry  Baudet,  the  new  populist  
figure  seems  to  be  attracting  former  voters  of  Geert  Wilders.  Additionally,  the  peak  of  
the  Flemish  VB  took  place  earlier  (2004),  compared  to  the  Dutch  populist  movements  
(the  electoral  success  of  PVV  at  the  2017  national  elections,  and  the  breakthrough  of  
FvD  at  the  2019  provincial  elections).   
   Whether  Belgium,  as  the  result  of  a  ‘forced  marriage’  –  the  marriage  bureau  of  
which  was  the  community  of  European  great  powers  –  continues  the  path  of  further  
federalization,  which  would,  sooner  or  later,  turn  the  federation  into  a  confederation,  is  
still  hard  to  tell.  Also,  if  the  Netherlands,  as  “an  orchestra  with  no  conductor,”308  would  
ever  find  its  way  back  to  the  pillarisation  pattern  and  draw  from  its  pragmatic  and  
traditionally  tolerant  political  culture,  is  yet  unknown.  The  above  thesis  reflected  the  
situation  and  conditions  of  April  2019  in  both  countries  –  the  analysis  of  further 
developments  will  be  the  concern  of  subsequent  studies.  In  any  case,  we  suppose,  that  
the  findings  of  the  introduced  and  compared  cases  are  models  of  a  comprehensive  
broader  –  European,  or  even  global  –  dynamism.  The  Low  Countries  are  believed  not  
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